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ABSTRACT—We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of
representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important
underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being
redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of
multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such
litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those
representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of
controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the
relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift
over time, (2) these shifts can result in new avenues for the shareholders to
express litigation power, (3) new agents will emerge to act on shareholders’
behalf when these shifts occur (or old agents will put on new hats), and
(4) a new set of principal–agent costs resulting from litigation will arise out
of these new relationships, leading to recurrent questions about how to best
control these costs in particular contexts. Applying our theory to recent
academic and practitioner claims of abusive multijurisdictional forum
shopping in representative corporate litigation, we conclude that these
claims are both overstated and misdirected. Instead, we find a significant
amount of what we call “fee distribution litigation.” In these cases,
multijurisdictional suits are filed by plaintiffs’ law firms largely to obtain a
slice of the total pool of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that are paid in a global
settlement in one of these cases. We show that fee distribution litigation is
quite different than traditional forum shopping and requires a different
policy response. We then consider various approaches and conclude that,
while no one of them is perfect, judicial comity is the best and least costly
option.
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INTRODUCTION
In an ancient Indian fable, six blind men touch an elephant to try to
understand what it is. Each of them feels a different part of the animal and
says what he thinks the elephant looks like based on what he has felt; since
they each touch a different segment of the elephant, their descriptions are so
different that they cannot possibly be describing the same thing. In one
version of the story, the rajah then explains to them that they are all right
because the elephant has all of the features that they have mentioned, but
that “you must put all the parts together to find out what an elephant is
like.”1
Research on different aspects of shareholder litigation reflects a similar
pattern. Many scholars have studied particular aspects of such litigation and
the costs associated with that piece, but invariably without taking into
account other pieces. Each is right, but only about the piece being
described. For example, recent literature on shareholder litigation includes
articles about derivative suits in federal courts,2 class action litigation in
state courts,3 and competition between courts,4 none of which fully takes

1

This paragraph paraphrases the ancient fable. It is recounted in several forms, but this version is
described in LILLIAN QUIGLEY, THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT 24 (1959).
2
See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (providing an empirical examination of shareholder derivative
suits in the federal courts).
3
See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349
(2012) (evaluating the impact of Congressional preemption and preclusion upon state court securities
class actions).
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into account findings in adjacent areas.5 To be truly effective, however,
corporate law scholarship needs to give a picture of the whole beast and not
just some of its parts.
In this Article, we begin by briefly revisiting the important role of
shareholder litigation in controlling opportunistic managerial behavior and
reducing managerial agency costs. With this background, we develop a
theory of shareholder litigation occurring in corporate and securities laws,
and describe how it changes over time. We then apply our theory to analyze
multijurisdictional litigation in shareholder lawsuits to explain that
phenomenon and the concerns it raises. Finally, we propose possible policy
solutions addressing those concerns.
Our theory is based on two core characteristics that shape shareholder
litigation. First, shareholders’ power to sue, along with their related powers
to vote and sell, derive from different national and state laws, which create
multiple sources for the substantive legal rules. Over time, the strength of
particular legal rules ebbs and flows as statutes, court rulings, and economic
contexts change. In response, shareholders adjust their preferred approaches
seeking to constrain managerial opportunism, including shifting litigation
from one jurisdiction to another. Importantly from our perspective, these
movements are dynamic and provide constantly changing arbitrage
opportunities.
The second core characteristic is that representative litigation
necessarily involves self-designated agents speaking for a collective group
and multiple agents competing for the coveted spokesperson role. In the
corporate context, representative litigation includes traditional derivative
suits brought by a single shareholder in the name of the entity and class
actions brought by one shareholder on behalf of a class of shareholders. In
such claims, plaintiffs’ lawyers typically have a greater economic stake in
the litigation than the individual representative shareholder, so litigation
agency costs may ensue.
4

See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345 (2012) [hereinafter Delaware Balancing] (examining the implications of a sharp drop in
Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation); John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian
Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (forthcoming 2012)
[hereinafter Delaware Cases] (presenting evidence that corporate lawsuits against Delaware companies
are increasingly brought outside Delaware); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias,
and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137 (2011) (arguing that
behavioral economics can provide insight as to why few incorporators contract around default rules and
adopt innovative self-help provisions).
5
We have contributed to these studies. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New
Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004)
[hereinafter New Look]; Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004) [hereinafter Derivative Lawsuits]. Our more recent
work takes a more global view by looking at all litigation arising from mergers over a two-year period.
See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions (Georgetown Law &
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11-23, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722227
[hereinafter Litigation in Mergers].

1755

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

To understand how shareholders enforce their litigation and other
rights, one must understand the principal–agent relationships that underlie
those rights. These relationships change over time, making it important to
examine them in their historical context. Our theory, which is based on
these characteristics, explains the various forms of representative litigation
and how they each change over time. It also illuminates the reasons for the
rise and fall of different types of litigation at particular times. Applying our
theory, we predict that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of
shareholder litigation will shift over time, (2) these shifts can result in new
avenues for the expression of shareholder litigation power, (3) new agents
will emerge to act on shareholders’ behalf when these shifts occur (or old
agents will put on new hats), and (4) a new set of principal–agent costs
resulting from litigation will arise out of these new relationships, leading to
recurrent questions about how to best control these costs in particular
contexts. The resulting variations lead to changes in management agency
costs, litigation agency costs, or both.
More broadly, this is a story of choice: first among the various legal
avenues available to shareholders seeking to check the broad powers that
law provides to managers in corporations, second among the different
litigants and law firms seeking to bring or defend litigation, and third
among the courts in the various jurisdictions in which the suits are brought.
Litigation is an important managerial agency-cost-reduction device for
shareholders, but they have other mechanisms as well, such as voting their
shares and selling their stock. The relative strength of each of these
monitoring devices changes over time, and the interaction of the three
affects the litigation pattern that we see. There are dynamic changes in the
strength of each of these monitoring devices, and these changes interact
with litigation in important ways.
Derivative suits were the dominant form of shareholder litigation for
most of the twentieth century. Concern about “strike suits”6 led to new laws
in the middle part of the century, requiring bonds and later demand upon
directors as a condition for bringing suits.7 Over time, shareholders brought
more corporate governance litigation in federal court under Rule 10b-5 in
order to avoid state law roadblocks and to benefit from the substantive
interpretations of federal securities laws that, for a time, were favorable for
such claims.8 Such action resulted in a surge of federal securities class
actions and the perception that more frivolous cases were being filed too

6

The term “strike suits” describes suits “brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon their
nuisance value.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (noting that
derivative suits have long been “the chief regulator of corporate management”).
7
See New Look, supra note 5, at 149–50 (discussing strike suits, bond requirements, and demand).
8
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988) (applying a presumption of reliance in a
fraud on the market context, facilitating filings of class action suits in a Rule 10b-5 context).
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quickly while meritorious cases settled too cheaply.9 This set the stage for
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which
mandated new methods to determine lead plaintiffs and their lawyers,
modified rules for pleading fraud, and imposed new constraints on
settlements and attorneys’ fees.10 A subsequent flow of securities class
actions to state court led to additional federal legislation banning state court
jurisdiction over such claims.11
Around the same time, Delaware decisions facilitated merger-related
class actions, a context not covered by the new federal laws.12 Agents
adapted to represent shareholder interests in this new forum, and legal rules
evolved to address agency costs such as judges’ efforts to cabin what they
saw as excessive fees in representative litigation to impose new rules for
determining lead plaintiffs.
In Part II, we apply our theory to address an element of corporate
litigation generating current scholarly and practice-oriented discussions:
allegations of forum shopping in corporate litigation in which simultaneous
claims are brought in multiple jurisdictions, allegedly for the purpose of
securing advantages unrelated to the substance of the claim. We first review
the arguments for and against forum shopping as a general practice and
show that recent increases in multijurisdictional litigation are largely not
forum shopping in the traditional sense. Rather, the pattern is that some
plaintiffs’ law firms file these cases in an effort to obtain a slice of the
attorneys’ fees awarded in representative litigation cases that settle. We call
this “fee distribution litigation” because these lawyers attempt to derive
economic rents by manipulating the jurisdictional and venue rules in which
litigation occurs, as distinguished from adding value through their litigation
efforts.
We then move on to assess the best methods to control and limit fee
distribution litigation. These include judicial solutions, such as increased
comity and cooperation, and potential legislative solutions, including the
federalization of litigation over acquisition-oriented class actions and
coordinated state legislation. We finish with a survey of the private ordering
solutions, including proposals for charter and bylaw amendments. We
9

See, e.g., John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 336 (1996) (“[T]he original focus of the
[PSLRA] reform debate was a concern in Congress that there had been an explosion of meritless
securities lawsuits, particularly class actions, filed solely for their settlement value . . . .”); Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2060–64 (1995) (discussing
practices prior to the PSLRA).
10
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C).
12
See New Look, supra note 5, at 135.
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conclude that none of the proposed solutions will eradicate fee distribution
litigation. However, when we balance the need to control managerial
agency costs with the litigation agency costs generated by this form of
multijurisdictional litigation, we conclude that judicial comity is the most
promising and also one of the easiest approaches to implement.
I.

SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND OTHER LIMITS ON
MANAGEMENT POWER
Law places corporate power in a centralized, hierarchical form that
management dominates.13 There are both efficiencies to such specialization
of function and also concerns that managers’ self-interest can depart from
the interests of those whose money is at risk. Various market
characteristics, contractual rights, and legal rules interact to constrain such
authority. Within corporate law, three limited powers are given to
shareholders: they can sell their stock, they can vote their shares, or they
can sue to enforce fiduciary duties or other obligations of officers and
directors.14
Our focus here is on the litigation power. We develop a theory to
describe the various alternatives for representative litigation, the costs and
benefits of each, and the dynamic flow of litigation among various available
alternatives. But the two other shareholder powers—to vote or to sell—
present parallel dynamics. Each can serve as a limit on centralized corporate
power, and if one avenue closes, shareholders and their agents will gravitate
to another. Any complete understanding of corporate governance must take
into account the substitution possibilities of the various remedies available
to shareholders, the incentives of the multiple players to move between
these remedies, and how that movement shapes new developments. The
dual sources of these rights in federal and state law limit the likelihood that
law will ever provide a single, uniform approach to addressing management
agency costs.
The interaction of the poison pill,15 shareholder voting, and shareholder
litigation provides a good example of this substitution dynamic. As lawyers
developed—and judges approved—management’s use of poison pills, this
innovative defensive tactic made acquiring control via purchase of shares in
a tender offer too expensive.16 A bidder’s effort to prevail in a hostile
13

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011).
See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216 (1999).
15
The poison pill is a director-implemented plan of a target corporation to make a hostile tender
offer prohibitively expensive to the bidder by providing all other shareholders other than the hostile
bidder with a right to buy new shares at half price. The practical effect is to close off shareholders’
ability to constrain management via selling shares by removing the bidder willing to buy those shares.
See ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 77 (2010).
16
The Delaware Supreme Court approved a board’s authorization of the poison pill in Moran v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur corporate law is not static. It must grow
14
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takeover came to depend on persuading holders to vote their shares for a
takeover, rather than persuading shareholders to sell their stock in a tender
offer.17 In other words, as selling became a less effective form of monitoring
corporate management, shareholders’ focus shifted to voting activities.
Litigation patterns also changed as the poison pill and other defenses gave
target directors more time to stop hostile takeovers. Litigation based on
federal tender offer legislation18—which largely had been used to delay
bidders—decreased, and claims arising under state law duties set out in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Inc. and Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., which invited closer judicial scrutiny of the
substance of takeover defenses, took on more importance.19
A second substitution example illustrates the interaction of voting and
selling, specifically in the context of classified boards as a takeover defense
under Delaware law.20 A Delaware statute authorizes classified boards,21
and the state’s supreme court has been generous in permitting companies to
use the combination of classified board provisions and poison pills to
effectively block shareholders’ ability to sell their shares.22 In response,
and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985))). The Moran
opinion concluded with a statement that the board’s obligation to redeem a poison pill would be subject
to judicial review, leaving open a check from the court. Id. at 1357. Within a few years, subsequent
decisions seemed to make clear that the Delaware Supreme Court would be reluctant to use such
authority. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 (Del. 1989) (overruling
the earlier chancery court decision in City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787 (Del. Ch. 1988), that had forced a board to redeem a poison pill).
17
The Delaware Supreme Court’s embrace in Paramount of the target directors’ decision to “just
say no” to a request to redeem the poison pill led bidders to launch a proxy contest to elect new
members to the board who would exercise the redemption rights in the pill, which in turn led to target
defensive tactics aimed at closing off the voting channel and Delaware decisions addressing shareholder
voting rights. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113–19 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(discussing when a defensive response makes a bidder’s ability to wage a successful proxy contest and
gain control of the target’s board realistically unattainable).
18
In 1968, Congress added §§ 13d and 14d–f to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, providing for
disclosure and other substantive regulation of tender offers. See Act Providing for Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership of Securities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified in relevant parts at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), n(d)–(f)).
19
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(directors’ duty in a takeover shifts to getting the best price for shareholders upon directors’ decision to
break up the company or put it up for sale); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (defensive tactics in a takeover
trigger intermediate judicial review where the board is required to show a threat and a proportional
response).
20
In “classified boards” with three classes, like in the U.S. Senate, only one-third of the seats turn
over at any one annual meeting, so that a hostile bidder seeking to acquire control of the majority of the
board, so as to direct the corporation, would need to wage proxy contests at two annual meetings.
21
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011).
22
See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010) (“The fact that a combination
of defensive measures makes it more difficult for an acquirer to obtain control of a board does not make
such measures realistically unattainable, i.e., preclusive.”); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas,
Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND.
L.J. 1087 (2012).

1759

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

institutional shareholders have turned from litigation to voting to protect
their assets. Their strategy is to make shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8 of the federal securities law to recommend deletion of classified
voting provisions in corporate charters and to threaten to vote against
directors who do not implement such recommendations.23 This strategy has
resulted in a remarkable shift in the governance structure of large American
corporations, which have largely abandoned classified boards in recent
years.24
The larger space for voting rights also illustrates the important and
sometimes distorting role of shareholders’ agents in the exercise of
alternative constraints; this role parallels traditional concerns expressed
about plaintiffs’ law firms in the exercise of shareholder litigation rights.25
A pronounced change in the shareholder census over the last half century
shows a sharp movement toward greater ownership of shares through
intermediaries such as retirement funds or mutual funds. These
intermediaries have looked to a second set of agents, proxy voting advisors,
to determine how these funds should exercise voting rights.26 In turn, there
has been a growing concern over agency costs associated with proxy voting
advisors and the potential distortion of voting rights by intermediaries and
their agents.27
While we see room to expand our analysis to include other forms of
shareholder power, such as voting and selling, this Article focuses on
litigation. However, we note that our theory could be used to explain
selection among different forms of shareholder power, as they illustrate the
same dynamic changes that we describe here with litigation.

23

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (proxy regulation permitting shareholders to include proposals
on a company’s proxy).
24
See TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON
REPORT 6–7 (2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/docs/2011USSeasonPreview (reporting
that shareholder support for board declassification proposals reached new highs, and the percentage of
S&P 500 firms with classified boards dropped significantly in recent years); see also Randall S. Thomas
& James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board
Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 389 (2007) (arguing that boards are increasingly
willing to remove the classified board structure in response to shareholders’ requests).
25
See Yin Wilczek, SEC Moving Soon to Address Proxy Advisory Firms, Official Says, 43 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 2354, 2354 (Nov. 21, 2011) (reporting remarks by Meredith Cross, SEC Director,
Division of Corporate Finance, made on November 10, 2011).
26
See James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals,
55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2010) (charting the effect of Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) voting
recommendations on shareholder and mutual fund voting).
27
See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 878
(2010); Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for
Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (2012).
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A. Underlying Factors that Explain the Frequency and Form of
Representative Litigation in Corporate and Securities Law
Shareholder representative litigation is different from other forms of
representative litigation in large part because of its managerial agency-costreduction characteristics. Representative suits including the classics—Smith
v. Van Gorkom,28 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,29 and more recently, In re
Southern Peru Copper Corp. Shareholder Derivative Litigation30 and In re
Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation31—illustrate the incredible
importance of corporate representative litigation in this capacity. Liability
rules and legal norms have been shaped and formed in large part through
the holdings in these and other similarly significant class actions and
derivative lawsuits. In this section, we focus on the three main types of
shareholder representative suits currently visible in corporate and securities
litigation: federal class actions that stem from allegations of fraudulent
misstatements and omissions, class actions arising out of mergers and
acquisitions, and derivative lawsuits claiming that a company’s officer or
director has caused the company harm in violation of the agent’s fiduciary
duty of loyalty.
Here, we identify the two core characteristics of shareholder litigation
that are relevant to our approach. First, litigation rights in corporate and
securities law arise from multiple independent legal sources in state and
national law. Our federal system produces separate and distinct systems of
state corporation law and federal securities laws, which are created and
enforced by different parts of our government. These disparate parts
generally work separately and independently of one another, subject to the
Supremacy Clause and other rules of our constitutional system.32 The
respective strength and practical importance of federal and state laws vary

28

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (plaintiff, as representative for class of shareholders, alleged harm
when directors agreed to merger in grossly negligent manner).
29
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (plaintiff, as representative for class of minority shareholders, forced
out of corporation via a cash-out merger on terms picked by the majority shareholder).
30
C.A. No. 961-CS, 2011 WL 6440761, at *43 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011) (class action alleging that
the corporation overpaid in purchasing a company from its controlling shareholder, leading to a $1.35
billion judgment (plus pre-and post-judgment interest) for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty), vacated
with order to parties to submit revised final order, C.A. No. 961-CS, 2011 WL 6476919 (Del. Ch. Dec.
22, 2011). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s judgment (including $304
million in attorneys’ fees). See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, Nos. 29, 2012, 30, 2012, 2012 WL
4335192 (Del Aug. 27, 2012).
31
25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (class action leading to a temporary injunction of a shareholder vote
on a buyout supported by management, as well as an injunction of the enforcement of defensive tactics
under the merger agreement).
32
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. State law must yield to conflicting federal rules, but Congress has
chosen not to supplant the general roles of incorporation found in state law, while still providing federal
securities law that can provide specific obligations to control managers’ behavior. See generally supra
notes 8–11 (citing major federal securities legislation).
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over time.33 The current state of our federalism suggests that these
variations will continue in the future, and as they do, parties will continue to
seek gains by choosing among the possible venues and types of claims.
Second, agency costs matter and arise in different ways depending on
the form of litigation. In addition to the managerial agency costs discussed
above, litigation can lead to agency costs as well. Shareholder suits under
both state and national law are most frequently representative, meaning that
the typical case involves one named plaintiff and, importantly, one or more
law firms for that prospective representative seeking to speak for a large
body of shareholders.34 This can lead to litigation agency costs, for example,
if agents bring what are perceived as strike suits or settle meritorious suits
too cheaply. As new forms of representative litigation develop, new agency
costs will accompany them. As a result, plaintiffs’ law firms will migrate to
newer, more fertile areas for litigation.
The last subpart of this section seeks to outline how the incentives of
three major players—plaintiffs’ law firms, defendants’ law firms, and the
courts—can be understood given the core factors we just described.
Plaintiffs’ law firms and their clients have an incentive to take advantage of
substantive differences in law among jurisdictions and to improve a
particular law firm’s standing in the litigation and its share of any attorneys’
fees that may follow. Defendants’ law firms and their clients care about
getting all the lawsuits arising out of a particular transaction dismissed in
one swoop, but their position in obtaining a favorable settlement can be
enhanced if the defendant can play one set of plaintiffs and law firms
against another, in what has been termed a reverse auction.35 Courts are the
third set of players. Some commentators have argued that states do not
compete for incorporation in terms of the long-debated race to the bottom or
the top, but rather that state courts compete to attract litigation.36 Such
competition takes multiple forms, including, for example, varying judicial
attitudes toward awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.37

33

Since 1995, major federal legislation includes the PSLRA, SLUSA, and the subsequent
enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley and the Dodd–Frank legislation. See supra notes 8–11.
34
See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 55–56 (1991) (noting argument of critics of shareholder suits that the plaintiffs’ bar is the true
beneficiary of the litigation).
35
See infra text accompanying note 257 (discussing reverse auctions).
36
See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition
and Litigation 7–8, 31 (Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1984758.
37
See id. at 5 (finding that some states, such as Delaware, California, Tennessee, Nevada, and
Georgia, award significantly higher attorneys’ fees than other states, including New Jersey, Illinois, and
Massachusetts); see, e.g., Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 49–50 (discussing possible Delaware
strategy to halt the outward migration of Delaware cases).
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1.

Multiple Shifting Sources of Substantive Legal Rules Regulating
Corporate Manager Behavior Open New Avenues for
Litigation.—Substantive legal rules that constrain the behavior of
those given the authority to control our largest corporations are found in
both state and federal law. State corporation law defines the authority of
managers, directors, and shareholders.38 Its rules—that directors can speak
for the corporation on all corporate actions and can delegate their authority
to managers—are the accepted starting points in both state and federal
law.39 The multiple state and federal laws provide different, and not
necessarily overlapping, methods to constrain these broad powers.
State law has long been a principal source of challenge to the misuse of
corporate power, particularly where states impose fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty upon those who control corporations.40 Federal securities laws,
and in particular, the antifraud prohibition found in Rule 10b-5, provide a
cause of action for misleading statements or omissions in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.41 Many corporate complaints have
elements of both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, so substitution of one
kind of litigation for another is a recurring possibility, even as the reach of
each law and its perceived utility changes over time.42 For example,
Delaware became a more attractive litigation venue when, in the 1980s, its
supreme court expanded the space for class actions in the context of
mergers.43 In federal law, an expansive period in the construction of Rule
10b-5 as applied to corporate governance issues was followed by a period
of retrenchment.44 Over time, federal securities law has broadened to take in
more and more of corporate internal affairs,45 so that more behavior is
covered by the two overlapping systems, and participants may be able to
pursue one action instead of another for strategic reasons.
Within this dual federal–state system, and a state system with more
than fifty jurisdictions, procedural and jurisdictional rules make it possible
to file suits in multiple jurisdictions arising from the same act, even if each
38

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT chs. 7–8 (2011) (naming shareholders, directors, and officers,
respectively, as participants in a corporation and defining their core roles). More than half of the states
have used the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) as the format for their act. See 1 MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN., at ix (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2011) (listing thirty-one states as adopting all or
substantially all of the MBCA as their general corporation statute).
39
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
40
See New Look, supra note 5, at 135–36.
41
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
42
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 904 (2003).
43
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
44
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty without
any deception, material misrepresentation, or nondisclosure did not violate the Securities Exchange
Act).
45
See Thompson & Sale, supra note 42, at 904 (discussing spread of federal law to legal obligations
of officers and managers).
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jurisdiction applies the same substantive law. This creates the possibility of
multiple filings in shareholder litigation. Thus, the general jurisdiction that
states provide to one or more of their courts, and judicial precedent that
frowns on one state limiting the jurisdiction of another, means a plaintiff
may sue directors in the corporation’s state of incorporation, or
alternatively, in the state where the corporation is headquartered (assuming
the defendants have the necessary presence in the jurisdiction).
Alternatively, many federal rights can be enforced in state courts,46 and state
rights may, in some cases, be brought in federal court.47
Over the last two decades, significant statutory changes have altered
this landscape. First, federal statutes preempted many state substantive
claims in the securities area.48 In addition, there has been some expansion of
the ability of federal courts to hear substantive claims arising under state
law.49 These changes, while notable and sometimes complex, are
incomplete. That incompleteness leaves open opportunities for multiple
plaintiffs, and the law firms representing them, to file representative
litigation while widening the array of policy issues to consider in
determining society’s proper response.
2.

Characteristics of Representative Litigation that Contribute to
Multiple Suits.—Representative litigation is different from what
might be termed ordinary corporate litigation, in which centralized
management speaks for the entity in litigation against an outside party.50 In
representative cases, an individual shareholder files suit on behalf of a large
group, either the entire corporation, as in the case of a derivative claim, a
class of shareholders affected by a change-of-control transaction (deal
46

This is true, for example, of rights under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006)
(concurrent jurisdiction in state courts for violations of the Securities Act except as to covered
securities), but not of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (exclusive jurisdiction in
federal courts for violations of the Securities Exchange Act).
47
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (judicial power of the federal courts shall extend to controversies
between citizens of different states). This diversity jurisdiction is provided to prevent bias against an
out-of-state plaintiff by permitting state claims to be heard in federal court when the parties are from
different states.
48
See, e.g., National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r) (preempting a long-standing state law regulation of
registration of securities issuance as to covered securities, such as those of the companies listed on a
national stock exchange); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (banning securities class actions arising
under state securities laws that had predated and paralleled portions of the federal securities laws).
49
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2006)) (broadening the diversity principle to assure a federal forum for
nationwide class actions); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1656 (2008) (the Class Action Fairness Act pulls “national-market
cases into the federal judicial system,” which is thought to be “less susceptible to capture and more
capable of remedying improper forum selection”).
50
See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989)
(bidder, acting through its board of directors, brought suit against target company).
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litigation), or on the market in a Rule 10b-5 suit alleging fraudulent
misrepresentations. The usual economics of these suits are that the
individual shareholder will not gain enough from a successful resolution of
the claim to make it worthwhile to incur the costs that a suit would entail.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers step into this gap.51 The attorneys’ fees that they are able
to collect from the entire group make it worthwhile for them to incur
substantial costs in pursuing the litigation; as such, they become the
economic driver of the typical representative litigation.52 Further, multipleplaintiff law firms can compete to be the class representative, and multiple
lawsuits, including in different jurisdictions, can be an effective way to shift
(or increase) attorneys’ fees.
In such a setting, however, law firms may have incentives to file too
quickly and too often, and to settle too cheaply.53 These problems have
triggered a series of legal reforms, for example: bond requirements for
derivative suits during the 1940s;54 demand requirements and special
litigation committees in the 1980s;55 and the PSLRA in 1995, which
requires courts to appoint lead plaintiffs, imposes heightened pleading
requirements for securities fraud class actions, and seeks to obtain more
judicial sanctions of abusive litigation.56
Most recently, commentators have pointed to a new form of litigation
agency cost—widespread forum shopping by plaintiffs’ law firms through
the use of multijurisdictional representative litigation.57 As evidence of such
activity, they cite a significant increase in the percentage of mergers and
acquisitions deals facing litigation.58 Typically, suits will be filed in a state
court in the state of incorporation, often the Delaware Court of Chancery,
and a second set of almost identical actions will be filed in a state court
where the company’s corporate headquarters is located. Both cases arise out

51

See Romano, supra note 34, at 55 (“[T]he cost of bringing a lawsuit, while less than the
shareholders’ aggregate gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff’s pro rata benefit.”).
52
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are inclined to fill the gap and finance litigation because “[t]he fee awarded to
class counsel, like the standard contingency fee, reflects payment for the lawyer’s assumption of risk
and cost of financing the litigation, as well as payment for legal services.” Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the
Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 660
(2002).
53
See New Look, supra note 5, at 152–57 (identifying indicia of litigation agency costs).
54
See id. at 150.
55
See id.
56
See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1500, 1503, 1507 (2006).
57
See e.g., Quinn supra note 4, at 155 (“The out-of-Delaware litigation strategy appears to be an
effort by plaintiffs’ counsel to skirt attempts by the Delaware judiciary to more closely monitor agency
costs associated with shareholder lawsuits.”).
58
See sources cited supra note 4.
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of the same transaction and make nearly identical claims under the law of
the state of incorporation.59
Undoubtedly, much of the impetus for multijurisdictional litigation in
representative litigation is driven by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein.60 There, the Court held that a
broadly written settlement release in an action in one jurisdiction controlled
settlements made later in other jurisdictions, creating big payoffs for the
particular plaintiffs’ firm in the settling jurisdiction, as well as providing a
possible advantage to the defendants in settling the litigation with one class
representative instead of another.61 In that case, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. (Matsushita) agreed to buy MCA, Inc., resulting in two
lawsuits brought on behalf of MCA shareholders. The first was a Delaware
state court action alleging that the MCA directors violated their fiduciary
duties to shareholders by failing to carry out a market check to meet
fiduciary duties set out in Revlon to obtain the best price for shareholders.62
The second was a federal action alleging that the terms of the tender offer
eventually agreed upon by the two managements involved MCA’s CEO and
COO receiving different consideration for their shares than other MCA
shareholders, and therefore violated federal tender offer rules requiring that
all shareholders receive the best price.63 Parties to the Delaware litigation
reached a settlement quickly, but the Delaware vice chancellor rejected the
Matsushita settlement because of the absence of any monetary benefits to
the class (while proposing a large attorneys’ fees award) and because of the
potential value of the federal claim that the settlement proposed to release.64
A subsequent global settlement proposed in state court eventually obtained
the Delaware court’s approval after the defendants added $2 million in cash
for the shareholders, and a federal court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, which permitted the Delaware vice chancellor to

59

See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022–CC, 2011 WL 1135016 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011). In In re Allion, a New York complaint was filed two days after the announcement of
a merger, followed by two Delaware complaints. The plaintiff in the second Delaware complaint then
withdrew that complaint and refiled in New York, and that plaintiff then became co-lead plaintiff in the
New York case. Id.
60
516 U.S. 367 (1996).
61
See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
62
Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 389–90 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the suit filed was in response to reports in the financial press that Matsushita was negotiating to buy
MCA and that the complaint was amended after the federal suit was filed to include waste claims arising
from the firm’s exposure to tender offer liability).
63
Id. at 370 (majority opinion). Although the Delaware complaint was amended to include a state
law claim that the side deal was unfair, there was no federal securities claim made under the 1934
Exchange Act, as the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in adjudicating such claims. Id.
64
In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 689–90, 696 (Del. Ch. 1991) (noting that the
state claim was extremely weak and that the only claim that had merit was the federal suit not asserted).
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downgrade his prior estimate of the high value accorded to the possible
federal suit.65
Two years later, however, a federal appellate court reversed the district
court and held that the Delaware settlement could not release Matsushita
from liability on the federal claims.66 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Delaware settlement was binding in all courts because of the Full
Faith and Credit Act.67 In a two-step analysis taken from Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,68 the Court determined first
that Delaware law would give preclusive effect to the settlement, which
would bar the federal claim from being litigated, and second that the
securities laws did not repeal, either implicitly or explicitly, the Full Faith
and Credit Act.69
Matsushita has stimulated multijurisdictional litigation filings by
plaintiffs’ law firms by creating incentives for plaintiffs and their law firms
left out of the litigation in the first court to seek a second court in which to
file. Once they have established control over the case in the second court,
they may be able to convince defendants to settle their action by offering to
release claims made in both cases.
3.

Shareholder Litigation as Compared to Other Aggregate
Litigation.—Shareholder litigation as representative litigation has
substantial commonalities with class actions generally, such that it shares
similar concerns and responses. Yet, there are some significant differences
in the corporate context. First, shareholder litigation plays a distinctive
governance role as a key constraint on management agency costs, more
specific than the compensatory and social welfare purposes of class actions.
Second, representative litigation in a corporate context presents a different
kind of risk. The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]here has been
widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies
litigation in general.”70 Third, the governance overlay means that litigation
procedures are intermixed with corporate governance issues, such as rules
as to who can speak for the corporation and the ability of shareholders to
contract about rules for making such a determination. Fourth, this corporate
focus also generates a specific Delaware concern regarding control of its
corporate law, which is seen as a valuable asset for that state.
65

In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 11,740 (Consolidated), 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1053 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 12, 1993), aff’d, 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993) (unpublished table decision). The settlement fund for
plaintiffs included attorneys’ fees, which Vice Chancellor Hartnett cut to $250,000. Id. at 1064.
66
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
67
Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
68
470 U.S. 373 (1985).
69
Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 386.
70
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
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There are many areas in which issues raised in shareholder litigation
parallel those in class actions more generally. Certainly class actions have
social welfare and compensatory functions, and courts are sometimes
portrayed as playing a fiduciary role.71 But at the same time, the specific
characteristics of shareholder litigation generate distinctive responses, as
reflected in the various legislative protections against abuse that have been
implemented in the corporate and securities areas but not in class actions
more generally.72
4. Understanding the Key Actors in Shareholder Litigation.—As
discussed above, the substantive and procedural laws governing
representative litigation and the economic incentives they create increase
the likelihood of multiple filings in shareholder litigation. To further
illustrate why, and to frame the discussion of possible responses, we pause
to focus separately on the roles of the three recurring players in the
shareholder litigation context.
a. Plaintiffs’ law firm agency costs.—Law firms, whose
business plans are based on filing representative litigation on the plaintiffs’
side, recognize that there is more than one possible representative for a
shareholder group and that they likely will be competing with other
plaintiffs’ firms to become the lead lawyer. Barriers to entry in this field are
fairly low. A law firm needs a client to file a suit, but in a publicly held
corporation with widely dispersed shareholders, there are numerous
possible clients. Even if another firm has already filed a lawsuit, there may
be good economic reasons, from the law firm’s standpoint, to file a second
suit. A suit filed in another jurisdiction may bring into play substantive
rights not covered in the first suit.73 Filing a second suit in the same court
may be advantageous if application of lead plaintiff provisions under
federal securities law (or under some state laws) could result in the laterfiling law firm being selected as class counsel. Alternatively, a law firm
may file a second suit in order to get a seat at the settlement table and a
claim to a share of the legal fees that may follow. Filing in another
jurisdiction can also divert the main focus away from the first forum in
favor of the new jurisdiction, and thereby allow a firm to claim control over
the entire litigation.
These multijurisdictional filings are the inevitable result of the
structure of the existing industry of plaintiffs’ law firms in this area.
Generally speaking, the larger, better funded firms will get the lead plaintiff
71

See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 49, at 1707–08 (citing Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (discussing courts as fiduciaries of class actions)).
72
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
73
See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 49, 70–71 (2011) (describing allegations against AIG alleging securities fraud in misleading the
market, a derivate suit alleging conscious disregard of risk by directors, as well as separate ERISA and
criminal suits).
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role in federal securities suits, which are the most potentially remunerative.
These firms are more likely to have developed relationships with the larger
institutional clients who will be chosen as lead plaintiff.74 These firms also
will be more likely to handle (and if necessary finance) the more intense
litigation.75
Newer, smaller firms with fewer financial resources will only be able
to enter the market if they find niches where they can litigate what they
perceive as good cases without investing large amounts of resources but
still earn sufficient fees to stay in business. Currently, multijurisdictional
deal litigation is the best candidate for many of these firms because:
(1) they can file these suits without making the type of investment
necessary to overcome the difficult pleading hurdles imposed by the
PSLRA in federal securities cases, (2) if they are shut out of the first-filed
action in Delaware, or another state court, they can still file cheaply in
either the state court of the target company’s headquarters or in federal
court, and (3) under Matsushita, if they can gain control of the litigation in
whichever jurisdiction they file, they can offer to settle their case and get
the entire matter dismissed. This creates substantial leverage with the other
plaintiffs’ law firms in competing cases in the event that the case settles
with an attorneys’ fee award.
Firms that spend substantial time and money to develop strong cases
risk being undercut by competing firms that have filed and settled in other
jurisdictions. Pressure from defendants’ firms to get a global settlement of
these cases,76 and to make sure all the firms that have filed cases participate
in the settlement, will lead to all of the plaintiffs’ firms getting some slice of
the fees awarded, cutting into the return of the firms that have done the
larger amount of the work.
b. Defendants’ firms’ agency costs.—Defendants’ firms, of
course, have little say in where corporate suits are initially filed, although
with federal cases they can enlist the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) panel
to transfer cases to a particular forum for pretrial proceedings.77 In both
74

See Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, The Class Action Industrial Complex, FORBES, Sept. 20,
2004, at 150, 157.
75
Well-established firms presumably have more resources, and to the extent that a firm must
borrow from a bank to finance litigation, “only the long-established plaintiff’s firms will be able to
borrow based on future earnings, and newer firms will be limited to the debt level that the personal
assets of their partners can collateralize.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 706 n.104 (1986).
76
Peter E. Kazanoff, Multijurisdictional Shareholder Challenges to M&A Transactions, in M&A
LITIGATION 2011, at 39, 43 (Practising Law Institute 2011) [hereinafter M&A LITIGATION] (“[D]efense
counsel almost always assert the ‘all-we-care-about-is-one-forum position’ . . . .”). Failure to include
any filing firm is likely to result in that firm objecting to the settlement and could potentially derail it.
77
James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities
Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 428–29.
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federal and state courts, they can file a forum non conveniens motion to
stay or dismiss the litigation on the grounds of an inconvenient forum.78
However, the possibility of multiple suits and the incentives of plaintiffs’
lawyers give defendants a powerful role in determining which suits are
settled and an opportunity for defendants and their lawyers to play one
plaintiff representative against another. Defendants have a strong preference
for getting all suits dismissed. As such, they look for a means to get all
plaintiffs involved in a global settlement. While defendants will generally
prefer to litigate the Delaware action—because of the predictability of the
decisions and attorneys’ fees awards in that forum79—and move to stay the
litigation in other venues, there have been instances where they appear to
have tried to settle weaker cases in other jurisdictions as a way of
undercutting the stronger Delaware action.80 Defendants can hold out the
lure to several plaintiffs’ firms of agreeing to a settlement with that plaintiff
that would have preclusive effect under Matsushita, leading to the different
plaintiffs competing for that result by offering settlement on terms
favorable to the defendant in what has been called a reverse auction.81 Such
a reverse auction may have several negative effects for shareholders,
including good cases being dismissed or not prosecuted effectively, as the
plaintiffs’ firms filing them see their efforts as providing little or no benefit
to them for the work provided. It may also encourage more multiple
jurisdiction filings as some of those plaintiffs’ law firms are rewarded for
their forum choice. In short, defendants will try to reach global settlements
of all cases arising out of the same transaction and may benefit from
Matsushita by conducting reverse auctions in settlements.
c. Competition between courts.—Corporate law is full of debate
about whether there is a race to the bottom or a race to the top among the
states—a debate that has not been fully resolved, but one that, in any event,
most academics believe Delaware has won.82 However, recently some
commentators have argued that Delaware courts are competing for cases

78

28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006) (forum non conveniens).
While at first blush it seems odd that defendants would seek to litigate a good case in Delaware,
remember that defendants’ law firms are paid by the hour and therefore may be able to bill more time on
a hard fought case. So long as the outcome is predictable, such a decision is likely to be in the best
interests of their client as well.
80
See, e.g., Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings,
Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (Laster, V.C.); Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 43 (“With
plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions, defense counsel charged with ensuring deal certainty may be
motivated to negotiate and reach a settlement with plaintiffs’ counsel who are the most willing to settle
their claim and forgo a preliminary injunction hearing.”).
81
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370 (1995) [hereinafter Class Wars] (developing the concept of reverse
auctions).
82
For a survey of some of the more recent literature, see ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW 114–51 (2d ed. 2010).
79
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with other courts,83 and some go so far as to say that Delaware is losing.84
These commentators argue that more and more corporate law cases are
being filed outside of the Delaware courts because of a perceived antiplaintiff bias, and that Delaware judges are trying various techniques to
move them back to their courtrooms.85 For example, Delaware awards fees
that are on average $400,000 to $500,000 higher than other courts,86 perhaps
suggesting to plaintiffs that they do better there than elsewhere. Delaware
judges gain prestige and influence from being the business court of the
nation.87 Delaware judges know that Delaware incorporations provide
benefits to the state—15% to 20% of the state’s budget arises from this
sector, and its judges have a platform unmatched by other states.88 However,
competition may develop if judges in other state courts similarly want to be
involved in high-profile corporate cases.
If such court competition exists, one would suspect that plaintiffs
would select a forum based on the experience and knowledge of the judges,
the predictability and speed of the decisions, and the perceived biases for or
against plaintiffs. In these respects, the Delaware courts have a number of
advantages. As the state of incorporation for the majority of the largest
American corporations, Delaware has developed a judiciary focused on
delivering a corporate law product.89 Within the state, the jurisdiction of the
court of chancery extends to all actions arising under the state’s corporation
law.90 The court’s five judges are repeat players in corporate law issues;
75% of their dockets arise from corporate law.91 These judges often have
corporate law practice experience prior to appointment to the bench, and
their steady diet of corporate law cases adds quickly to that background.92 In

83

See Quinn, supra note 4, at 143; Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 61 (2009).
84
See generally Delaware Cases, supra note 4 (detailing the trend of filing suits outside of
Delaware).
85
See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 2 (describing attempts to attract corporate shareholder
litigation to Delaware).
86
Id. at 5.
87
See Stevelman, supra note 83, at 98, 109 (noting Delaware judges’ “effort to keep forum in highprofile Delaware corporate lawsuits”).
88
ROMANO, supra note 82, at 117.
89
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 111(b) (2011).
90
See Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 29–33 (discussing cases in which judges were
sometimes critical of attorneys’ fees); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36 (discussing recent cases awarding
large attorneys’ fees).
91
See, e.g., New Look, supra note 5, at 165–66 (finding that about 75% of the civil actions filed in
the New Castle County Chancery Court are classified as corporate matters).
92
For example, before becoming a judge, Chancellor Strine was a corporate litigator at Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Vice Chancellor Laster was a director in the corporate department of
Richards, Layton & Finger and later formed the corporate boutique firm Abrams & Laster (later
renamed Abrams & Bayliss); and Vice Chancellor Glasscock worked in the litigation department of
Prickett, Jones & Elliott, a Delaware firm specializing in corporate work. See Judicial Officers of the
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most other states, judges who hear corporate cases are based in courts of
general jurisdiction whose dockets are filled with criminal law, family law,
and other cases.93
Another way courts could compete is based on speed of resolution. The
chancery court has developed a commitment to expedited proceedings,
which is shared by the Delaware Supreme Court, which hears any appeals.94
This is important in deal cases because it gives the plaintiff an opportunity
to seek an injunction to stop the deal from closing on a timely basis, or, at
the very least, the opportunity to schedule such a hearing as leverage to
force the defendants to settle and remove the threat of an injunction. Other
courts must develop such policies too, or they will not effectively compete
for cases.
In such court competitions, differences in particular procedural
practices can provide some courts with advantages over others.95 For
example, if Delaware is not willing to schedule a preliminary injunction
hearing in a merger case before the defendants have sent out a proxy
statement to the target company’s shareholders, other jurisdictions’ courts
may be willing to move forward without waiting. Similarly, if Delaware is
normally unwilling to enjoin a transaction where no other bidder has come
forward,96 other jurisdictions could try to compete by offering such a
possibility. Finally, courts that do not permit juries, such as the Delaware
Chancery Court, may be less able to attract plaintiffs seeking to try the case,
as they cannot offer a sympathetic jury in a court of equity.97
A third factor that could cut either for or against Delaware is the
predictability of the outcome on the merits of such cases; Delaware has a
more experienced judiciary and much more developed precedent in
corporate law than any other state. This may mean its law is more certain
and judges are more likely to quickly grasp the main threads and the
nuances of the questions at issue.
Court of Chancery, DELAWARE ST. CTS., http://courts.state.de.us/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Sept.
21, 2012).
93
Some states have created special business courts, but those courts do not match Delaware in
terms of the volume of cases or their sophistication.
94
See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000) (“Delaware courts are also known for their ability to
respond to business litigation quickly through, for example, granting expedited hearings and providing a
rapid turnaround time on decisions.”).
95
Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 42–43 (“[L]iberal discovery rules in a particular jurisdiction may help
shareholder plaintiffs leverage a settlement if the participants in the transaction become concerned that
burdensome document requests, depositions, and other discovery will interfere with or delay the closing
of a transaction.”).
96
See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 838 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Absent
an injunction, the Del Monte stockholders will be deprived forever of the opportunity to receive a prevote topping bid . . . .”).
97
The absence of a substantial number of cases that actually go to trial mutes the impact of this
factor.
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Another factor is the judiciary’s attitude toward these cases. Delaware
judges may be overly concerned for corporations’ welfare, according to
some critics, which could hurt them in such a competition. However, a
sympathetic hometown judge where the company is headquartered may act
the same way if the deal at issue is likely to result in large-scale layoffs of
employees or closing executive offices within the headquarters state.98
In a related vein is a court’s willingness to award attorneys’ fees. At
different times, Delaware judges have appeared to be more or less hostile to
the size of attorneys’ fees awards.99 Chancery court judges do not give
much deference to the parties’ agreement on fee levels, which can lead to
lower awards.100 By comparison, other state courts may compete by
acquiescing to the number agreed to by the defendants and plaintiffs.101 In
sum, courts may compete to attract corporate litigation, and that can
influence where cases get filed.
Finally, plaintiffs’ law firms may believe that certain judges are more
sympathetic to them than others. For example, an attorney that has clerked
for a particular judge may think that this judge has a slight bias in his favor.
Alternatively, an elected judge may be perceived to be beholden to major
campaign contributors. While every court employs law clerks, not all
judges are elected, including the judges on the Delaware Chancery Court,
so this factor may lead to some cases being filed outside of Delaware.
B. Representative Litigation Today: Applying the Model to Understand
Recent Patterns of Filing and Case Settlements
Representative litigation in the corporate and securities area is visible
today in three prominent contexts. One context is class actions alleging
fraudulent misstatements or omissions by companies to their shareholders
in violation of federal securities laws. These class actions are sometimes
paired with state derivative suits based on the same fact pattern, which
allege breach of the directors’ state law fiduciary duties.102 A second context
presents as “deal” litigation, typically class actions challenging the terms of
98

Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 42.
See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36.
100
See Pamela S. Tikellis, Under the Microscope—Disclosure Based Settlements and
Multijurisdictional Litigation, in M&A LITIGATION, supra note 76, at 95, 97 (noting that the Delaware
Chancery Court is reducing fee awards in disclosure-only settlements in recent years, even when the
amount of the award is unopposed).
101
Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 43 (“By bringing a case in an alternative jurisdiction, plaintiffs may
see an opportunity to obtain approval of a settlement—and a fee for their counsel—that might otherwise
raise concerns in Delaware.”); Charles M. Nathan, Designating Delaware as the Exclusive Jurisdiction
for Intra-Corporate Disputes, in M&A LITIGATION, supra note 76, at 111, 113 (noting that plaintiffs’
lawyers hope that “courts outside of Delaware are less likely to limit or reduce plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee
awards”).
102
See generally Erickson, supra note 73 (detailing the parallel litigation that frequently occurs in
instances of corporate fraud).
99
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proposed or consummated acquisitions as breaches of fiduciary duties by
management, directors, or both based on the law of the entity’s state of
incorporation. A third distinctive context, visible in contemporary litigation,
is populated by traditional freestanding derivative suits (i.e., separate from
securities class actions in our first category) that challenge the terms and
conditions of interested transactions in which directors or officers have
conflicts of interests or other purported breaches of fiduciary duties as
determined by the corporations law of the issuer’s state of incorporation. In
this section, we lay out the main characteristics of each type of case as well
as the factors leading to their being filed in multiple jurisdictions.103
1.

Rule 10b-5 Class Actions with Tagalong Derivative
Suits.—Federal securities class actions alleging violations of Rule
10b-5 of the 1934 Exchange Act or similar provisions of the 1933
Securities Act remain the most visible form of shareholder litigation in
corporate and securities law.104 A corporate event producing an adverse
market reaction regularly generates multiple suits; these suits allege failure
to disclose information and seek to represent the class of shareholders who
bought or sold after the nondisclosure.105 Long-standing concerns about
vexatious litigation have produced a variety of legislative “fixes” already
mentioned.106 The filing of these suits in federal courts has meant there are
additional tools, such as the MDL panel provisions,107 for dealing with
multijurisdictional suits. An additional element of the multiplicity of filings,
left relatively untouched by legislative reforms, occurs because these same
factual contexts often generate shareholder derivative suits arising under
state corporate law alleging breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties. This
provides a context to examine the extent to which the interaction of
plaintiffs’ law firms, defendants’ law firms, and courts works to combat
some of the problems arising from filings in multiple jurisdictions.
Since more than one person can claim to speak for the class, multiple
suits are possible as different plaintiffs and law firms compete to speak for
the group. Different procedural rules, however, have meant that the
resolution of these multiple claims is a bit more orderly than the state law
103

The material in this section is based on confidential conversations with judges, plaintiffs’
lawyers, and defense counsel. These conversations were all undertaken with the understanding that the
participants would not be identified and that none of their comments were for attribution. We have
provided citations where there are published sources available.
104
The Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse reports an average of 194 suits per year between 1997
and 2010. Press Release, Stanford Law School Class Action Clearinghouse, Securities Class Action
Filings Increase Slightly in 2011, According to Report by Stanford Law School and Cornerstone
Research (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/Cornerstone_Research_
Filings_2011_YIR_Release.pdf; see also Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31 tbl.1 (reporting an
average of about eighty transactions a year in the 2005–2010 period for litigation acquisitions).
105
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
106
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
107
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (providing for a panel on multidistrict litigation in federal courts).
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class actions described below. Since 1995, federal law has provided a
uniform way to pick a lead plaintiff among the various parties that would
like to represent the class: the court selects a plaintiff, or group of plaintiffs,
as lead plaintiff with the power to select a law firm or firms to represent the
class; there is a presumption that the plaintiff with the largest financial stake
should be named the lead plaintiff.108 Federal procedural rules addressing
multidistrict litigation further provide guidance in working out conflicts
among multiple courts.109 As a practical matter, these rules give the firms
with the biggest clients and the most resources a significant advantage in
obtaining the lead law firm positions in these cases. Law firms that did
not—or could not—win the lead firm position are forced to look for
alternative routes to participate.
In federal securities class actions, the losing plaintiffs’ law firms—or
those that lack the resources to litigate these relatively long and expensive
cases—often file derivative suits arising out of the same underlying set of
facts but alleging state law claims, such as breach of the duty to monitor, or
a federal proxy fraud claim.110 Thus, a federal securities class action under
Rule 10b-5 may allege that a company made material misrepresentations or
omissions relating to a product development or securities issuance, causing
an adverse effect on the company’s stock price. The derivative suit in such a
setting might allege that the company’s directors breached their fiduciary
duties in acting for the corporation, for example, by failing to meet their
duty of care in regard to the conduct that generated the misleading
disclosure.111
These Rule 10b-5 suits, arising under federal securities law, can be
brought in any federal district court where jurisdiction can be found, but are
usually filed in the district where the company is headquartered.112 The
derivative suit’s state law claims will be resolved under the law of the state
of incorporation (i.e., Delaware for the majority of public corporations).113
While based on state substantive law, these derivative suits may be filed in
the Delaware Chancery Court or in a state court in the headquarters state of
108

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006) (governing the appointment of lead plaintiff).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
110
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of small plaintiffs’ law firms that file such cases
without competing in the lead plaintiff competition surrounding the class action. There are low barriers
to entry in this type of litigation for these newcomers, as they do not actually engage in much litigation
in the cases that they file. See Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the
Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 478 [hereinafter Fragmentation]
(describing tagalong suits as attracting small firms that previously brought securities class action suits
and switched to derivative suits).
111
See Erickson, supra note 2, at 1756.
112
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31 (reporting only four cases outside of the headquarters
jurisdiction or state of incorporation).
113
This is the internal affairs doctrine. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78
(1987); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005); In re
The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007).
109
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the company (which typically would have jurisdiction to hear a claim
arising under the law of another state). An alternative, less favorable choice
is to bring these state-law-based derivative cases in the same federal court
as the Rule 10b-5 cases, relying on diversity jurisdiction.114 If they choose to
file the state law claim in the same federal court hearing the Rule 10b-5
claim, the plaintiff and its law firm facilitate coordination of the cases for
discovery and eventually for settlement.115
In settlement negotiations between the parties, these derivative suits
are commonly settled with the federal class actions and are assigned a
relatively small part of the value of any settlement funded by the directors’
and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) policy of the defendant firm.116 In
some circumstances, the derivative claims may generate additional
settlement funds based on payments made by the individual defendants, or
more commonly they may permit the plaintiffs to obtain corporate
governance changes at the defendant firms, a benefit that is not usually
achievable in the class action.117 Moreover, these “tagalong” cases are
almost never litigated actively on their own, as the state law claims are
often weak ones and the procedural barriers that they face are quite high;
they are generally filed after a securities class action and they rise or fall
with the success of the federal class action.118
Securities class actions have been among the most studied forms of
litigation in corporate and securities laws, particularly after the PSLRA
introduced the problem of multiple litigations in the same court, which it
resolved through the lead plaintiff provision already discussed.119 Our focus
here is on a relatively less studied context: when federal securities class
actions and state-law-based derivative suits are brought against the same
company. Professor Jessica Erickson finds that in 75% of the derivative

114

Interview with plaintiffs’ attorney (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file with authors) (The main problem for
plaintiffs with filing the derivative suit in federal court is that the derivative suit will be stayed pending
resolution of any motion to dismiss in the federal securities law class action. In some cases, a second
wave of derivative suits will be filed in federal court after the resolution of the motion to dismiss in the
Rule 10b-5 class action because if the court has ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, discovery will get
underway.).
115
Researchers are much more able to locate the federal cases because the PACER electronic
docket service is available for federal cases, whereas relatively few state courts have electronic filing
and document systems at present. State court may have some advantages for the plaintiffs, as the
discovery rules may be more favorable than in federal court.
116
For a discussion of the role of D&O insurance in the settlements of securities fraud class actions,
see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 796–804 (2009).
117
See Erickson, supra note 73, at 84–85 (discussing when derivative suits may be the only way to
pursue legal redress).
118
See id. at 73 (comparing filing dates).
119
See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative Litigation,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 152 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell eds., 2012) (providing an overview of research regarding securities class actions).
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cases there were also 10b-5 securities class actions.120 These federal
derivative suits are almost always filed in the federal district court where
the headquarters of the company is located. For more than half of the
companies, there is also a derivative case filed in a state court.121
Relevant to our discussion, 82% of the federal derivative claims are
filed after the securities class action and state court derivative claims (hence
the term tagalong).122 Erickson found that most of these cases produced
nothing in the way of specific monetary recovery for the company; more
than two-thirds were dismissed (as compared to 30% in overall federal
litigation),123 and only 2 of the 101 cases (exclusive of the backdating cases)
produced any meaningful financial benefit for the company.124
Nonmonetary relief was more common, and often came in the form of
corporate governance changes, such as more independent directors or
splitting the chief executive officer and chair of the board positions.125
Having achieved such a result, which is not possible in the class action
federal securities cases focusing on misstatements,126 the derivative attorney
enters into discussions as to how attorneys’ fees should be shared.
Erickson finds that many of the same firms are repeat players in these
derivative suits, which can be indicia of litigation agency costs in
representative litigation.127 Erickson also finds that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
who bring the federal derivative suits, while repeat players, tend to be a
different group than those who bring the securities fraud class actions.128
She suggests that the derivative claims are brought by plaintiffs’ firms that
are growing their way into a role in the bigger money securities class
actions.129
What are we to make of these findings? There clearly seems to be a
large number of derivative cases based on the corporate law of the
company’s state of incorporation that are brought after a securities class
action has been initiated. It is plausible that they result in additional
nonmonetary benefits to shareholders. However, given that there is almost
120

Erickson, supra note 73, at 62. This rises to more than 80% after the elimination of backdating
cases. Id. at 62 n.54. Backdating cases are discussed in more detail infra Part I.B.3.
121
Id. at 65.
122
Id. at 72–73.
123
Erickson, supra note 2, at 1794 (comparing to a study in two federal district courts).
124
Id. at 1803.
125
Id. (showing that corporate governance settlements are far more common for classic derivative
suits). These corporate governance changes in some cases bear little relation to the wrong alleged, but
they do count as a benefit to the corporation that can support an award of attorneys’ fees.
126
Class counsel is reluctant to seek corporate governance changes where they may result in a
lower monetary recovery for the class.
127
Erickson, supra note 2, at 1768–69.
128
Id. at 1769; see generally New Look, supra note 5, 152–56 (describing indicia of litigation
agency costs).
129
Erickson, supra note 2, at 1769.
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never a cash payment associated with these suits, and no reason to think
that they lead to higher total attorneys’ fee awards for plaintiffs’ law firms,
their most significant impact is likely a shifting of attorneys’ fees among
the plaintiff law firms that have brought these suits. The lawyers bringing
the derivative claims seem to have a seat on the bus, but they are not
driving it.
Prior to the lead plaintiff provisions enacted in the PSLRA, plaintiffs’
lawyers filed multiple class action suits against the same company in the
same federal court and, if the court did not name the first to file as lead
plaintiff, it later worked out the individual roles in the litigation for each of
the law firms involved under the umbrella of judicial supervision.130 How
different are law firm practices today? Given that this tagalong derivative
litigation usually occurs before the same judge, and that most derivative
suits are filed in the same jurisdiction as the prior class action suits, the
possible abuses of multiple litigation and forum shopping seem muted.
As our theory predicts, this new form of derivative litigation arose
because of changes in underlying legal rules that forced some existing
plaintiffs’ law firms to adjust their practices to maintain a seat at the
settlement table. Other firms may have also entered the market when these
new avenues for representative litigation opened up. Here, however, the
resultant litigation agency costs seem muted, as the overall impact of the
new cases appears largely to lead to a reallocation of attorneys’ fees among
plaintiffs’ law firms.
2. Deal Litigation.—Mergers and other acquisitions frequently
generate conflict between shareholders and managers. For example,
management will regularly implement defensive tactics that block thirdparty offers at a price offering an attractive premium over the current
market price. Alternatively, management may make a deal with a buyer that
shareholders believe is too low, perhaps because the preferred bidder is the
majority shareholder or a private equity group that is likely to retain current
management. State corporation law, particularly in Delaware, has
developed doctrines of fiduciary duty that provide the basis for such
litigation.131 The multiplicity of suits that arise in this context will be
governed by the law of the entity’s state of incorporation, even if they are
brought in different jurisdictions.132 This is the “internal affairs doctrine,” a
widely accepted feature in American jurisdictions that provides that internal
130

See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 9, at 2062. This is still common practice in mergers and
acquisitions litigation, although as we noted above, cases are increasingly filed in different courts.
131
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
132
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(directors’ duty in a takeover shifts to getting the best price for shareholders upon directors’ decision to
break up the company or put it up for sale); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985) (defensive tactics in a takeover trigger intermediate judicial review where the board is
required to show a threat and a proportional response).
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governance rights of shareholders, directors, and officers should be
determined by the law of the state where the entity is incorporated.133
Deal suits are usually brought as class actions on behalf of the entire
group of shareholders who have been harmed by the alleged misconduct
(for example, seeking a higher dollar value than all the shareholders would
have received had the directors not blocked an offer). Multiple suits are
possible to the extent that different plaintiffs and different plaintiffs’ law
firms each step forward seeking to represent the group. Since Delaware is
home to a large majority of America’s largest corporations, its courts are a
common venue for these suits. When multiple class actions arise in a single
jurisdiction, as in Delaware, it is common to see a consolidation order
overseen by a judge, which reflects a split of responsibilities worked out
among the lawyers for the plaintiffs and presented as a proposed resolution
to the judge.134
Multiple suits challenging the same conduct in a deal may also be filed
in more than one jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules are such that in addition to
the state of incorporation, it is also possible to bring the suit in courts of
general jurisdiction of another state that has jurisdiction over the
defendants.135 In the corporate setting, this will be possible in the state
where the company’s headquarters is located. Alternatively, federal courts
can hear these cases based on diversity jurisdiction.136 These courts—the
state court in the state of incorporation or a federal court hearing the case
based on diversity—will apply the substantive law of the state of
incorporation to all breach of fiduciary duty claims but provide an
alternative forum that creates the possibility of multiple suits based on the
same underlying facts.137
Deal cases are filed in a particular state court as a result of a number of
strategic considerations. Delaware, as the home to roughly 60% of
America’s public corporations, provides the setting where this choice has
most often been visible.138 Frequently, jurisdictional considerations dictate
the choice to file in the Delaware Chancery Court (its law provides
133

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle of corporation
law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic
corporations . . . .”).
134
See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., C.A. No. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jul.
9, 2002) (noting the usual experience that plaintiffs and their counsel are able to negotiate an acceptable
structure for the management of litigation “without involving the court in that process”).
135
Each state determines the jurisdiction of its courts subject to constitutional limits of due process.
The Supreme Court has held that as a general proposition a state cannot, by legislation, effectively divest
other states’ courts of the power to hear cases over which they would otherwise have jurisdiction. See
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359–60 (1914).
136
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
137
Other less common iterations of multiple suits arise from derivative suits, discussed in the
following section, or a suit based on the proxy provisions of the federal securities law.
138
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON.
383, 391 tbl.2 (2003).
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automatic jurisdiction over directors and officers of corporations chartered
in the state139) or in the state of the company’s headquarters, where there is
likely to be personal jurisdiction over the company and most of the
individual defendants.140
Some of the Delaware advantages described above have particular
salience in the deal context. Delaware’s ability to deliver a speedy
resolution will be prized since the pending deal provides both parties reason
to want to conclude the litigation while the money is still on the table. The
expertise of the Delaware court may also be valued, since deals are often
complex, and the parties stand to benefit by having a judge who has a
background in the area.
Courts in a non-Delaware jurisdiction will be attractive to a plaintiffs’
law firm that has reason to think it will be shut out from participating in the
Delaware litigation or shunted to a less influential position with a smaller
share of attorneys’ fees. Delaware courts have moved toward a lead plaintiff
approach similar to that implemented under the PSLRA. As a result,
attorneys who do not have the client with the largest financial interest, or
some other expertise that will cause them to be picked by the chancery
court, will see the virtue of filing in a second jurisdiction. This may enable
the firm to get a seat at the table that it would not have been able to obtain
in Delaware when the time comes to settle the cases. Alternatively, the
second attorney may even be able to get control of the case by persuading
the court in the headquarters jurisdiction to decide the case and then seek
res judicata preclusion of the other case under Matsushita.141 The second
attorney may be aided in this strategy by the support of the attorneys for the
defendant who see the second jurisdiction and the second plaintiffs’
attorney as more amenable to settling the case on terms that are favorable to
the corporation. In such a setting, the defendants may be able to launch a
reverse auction among plaintiffs’ firms and drive down the costs for settling
the case.142
Courts in the non-Delaware jurisdiction may also be attractive for other
reasons. The sometimes-expressed hostility to liberal attorneys’ fees in
Delaware has already been mentioned. In addition, Delaware traditionally
has not permitted discovery prior to a motion to dismiss in derivative
suits,143 a practice that predates the federal law’s adoption of a similar rule
for class actions in the PSLRA and which makes it more difficult for the
139

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (1999 & Supp. 2010).
See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Federal courts may also hear deal litigation under
federal question jurisdiction if the complaint also raises claims for false and misleading proxy
disclosures under § 14 of the 1934 Exchange Act. Interview with plaintiffs’ lawyer (Jan. 31, 2012) (on
file with authors).
141
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
142
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
143
Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1379.
140
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plaintiff’s case to get past that initial hurdle. Procedural rules in other states
are not always as severe and, under prevailing doctrine, those states can
apply their own procedural rules even when they must apply the substantive
rules of the state of incorporation.144
Our prior study of Delaware litigation over a two-year period
illustrates many of these factors in the deal litigation context. We found that
litigation against publicly held companies overwhelmingly arose out of
deals and was in the form of class actions as opposed to derivative suits.145
Generally, multiple suits are filed very quickly after the announcement of a
deal, by law firms who are repeat players in such litigation.146 Data from the
suits that produced settlements indicated that suits in which managers had a
conflict of interest in the proposed deal were the most likely to produce
cash settlements,147 and that these deal suits did not indicate the same degree
of litigation agency costs as suggested for earlier representative suits.148
Subsequent expansion of this data set to include all litigation arising out of
deals in this two-year period found that 12% of deals had litigation;
litigation decreased the likelihood of a deal closing, but also increased
return on the deals that closed, so that overall it was associated with an
increased return for the deals where there was litigation.149
Recent empirical studies provide information on deals in a broader
time period and focus on particular aspects of these deals. Armour, Black,
and Cheffins, for example, developed a data set of the top twenty-five
M&A deals each year for a fifteen-year period beginning in the mid-1990s.
Delaware firms, which made up two-thirds of their sample, were sued in
47% of the deals, with a surge between 2005 and 2009.150 During this more
recent period, the growth in large deal litigation was in suits filed in states
other than Delaware, so that all litigation was outside Delaware in almost
half of the cases filed.151 Litigation in federal courts in this data set was
considerably less frequent.152
Professors Armour, Black, and Cheffins have a second data set of all
leveraged buyout transactions over a fifteen-year period that produced
similar results.153 Delaware firms made up 63% of the sample, and again,
144

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. d (1971) (“[A] court under
traditional and prevailing practice will apply its own state’s rules involving process, pleadings, joinder
of parties, and the administration of the trial . . . .”).
145
New Look, supra note 5, at 137.
146
Id. at 138.
147
Id. at 199 tbl.17.
148
Id. at 192–98 (suggesting a lower percentage of recovery for attorneys and a greater percentage
of cases producing some financial benefit for shareholders).
149
Litigation in Mergers, supra note 5, at 2, 20.
150
Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1356–57 & fig.3.
151
Id. at 1356.
152
Id. at 1358 fig.4.
153
Id. at 1360 & fig.6.
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47% of the Delaware firm deals involved litigation.154 The trend for
litigation to occur in Delaware—73% in the 1997–2001 part of the study—
declined in the 2005–2009 period.155 Again, suits in federal courts made up
a smaller portion of the study.156
Studies by two other scholars confirm a similar split in where litigation
occurs. Professor Jennifer Johnson’s 2010 sample of class actions found
that 45% occur in states other than Delaware, 40% in Delaware, and 18% in
federal court.157 Professor Brian Quinn’s study of deals done in 2009–2010
found that 40% of litigation is outside of Delaware and the incidence of
deals leading to suits is even higher.158 None of these studies present data on
the outcome of the litigation.
Two other studies provide information about the outcome of litigation.
Robert Daines and Olga Koumrian’s study for Cornerstone Research, which
collected data through early 2012, found that Delaware’s share of M&A
litigation increased steadily after 2008.159 Their study of challenges to 2010
and 2011 M&A deals found that 67% settled and that 83% of the
settlements were for additional disclosure only.160 Professors Cain and
Davidoff’s sample of litigation arising from deals between 2005 and 2010
found a settlement number in the same range with a smaller number of
disclosure-only settlements.161 Both studies tracked attorneys’ fees, the Cain
and Davidoff study reporting data for a much larger percentage of
settlements but with mean and median figures in the same range.162
What are we to make of these empirical studies? Deal litigation
appears to be a large and distinct category of representative litigation. These
suits are usually brought as class actions under the corporation law of the
entity’s state of incorporation. There have long been multiple suits in the
same jurisdiction arising out of the same deal as different plaintiffs and
their law firms seek to represent the class. Over time, more of these suits
154

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
156
Id. at 1360–61 & fig.7.
157
Johnson, supra note 3, at 377 fig.11 (reporting 265 filings against 193 Delaware companies of
which 103 were in Delaware, 115 were in another state, and 47 were in federal court).
158
Quinn, supra note 4, at 147.
159
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: MARCH 2012 UPDATE 6 tbl.5
(2012), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/Publication/2af469a2-f24a-4435-96c0-a36d
24a541ae/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/876cdfd2-d105-408e-aee0-a37fe880c07a/Cornerstone_
Research_Shareholder_MandA_Litigation_03_2012.pdf (reporting increase from a 34% share in 2007 to
a 45% share in 2011 and 2012).
160
Id. at 9, 11 (results from a sample of 202 settlements related to 2010 and 2011 litigation).
161
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 33 tbl.2 (reporting settlements in 69.8% of 447 litigation
outcomes over the 2005–2010 period while only making up 52% of the litigation sample).
162
Id. at 34 tbl.2 (reporting mean attorneys’ fees of $1.27 million and median of $595,000 for
settlements of litigation of 2010 deals). Daines & Koumrian show a median and mean in the same range
with fee data from 88 of the 202 deals with litigation. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 159, at 12.
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have moved beyond Delaware to be litigated elsewhere, most often in the
courts of the entity’s headquarters state, and often suits are filed in both
venues.
This change does not reflect differences in substantive laws, as most of
these suits seek to apply Delaware law. Rather, filings in non-Delaware
jurisdictions are driven by plaintiffs’ law firms’ interests as firms seek to
gain shares of any potential attorneys’ fees awards. They may also reflect a
hostility to attorneys’ fees awards, perceived in some opinions of the
Delaware Chancery Court,163 although there is more recent judicial language
suggesting a somewhat different approach to attorneys’ fees.164 The addition
to the plaintiffs’ bar of new small firms may be driving a broader
geographical search for lawsuits.165 Smaller, less well-established firms are
less likely to win in Delaware’s lead plaintiff contest,166 forcing them to file
in other jurisdictions to get a share of any attorneys’ fee awards. Another
contributing factor may be that one of the more visible plaintiffs’ firms,
Milberg Weiss, split into east and west coast branches and later suffered
losses when several partners went to jail related to behavior with clients in
class actions.167 This led to more suits being filed outside of Delaware by
the spin-off firm of Lerach Coughlin.168 As a more diverse plaintiffs’ bar
has grown up, these lawyers may be more comfortable outside of Delaware
or at least may like having an additional place to bring suit. We consider the
possibility for reform in Part II.
Shifts in federal substantive and procedural rules led plaintiffs’ law
firms to shift representative litigation into mergers and acquisitions class
action litigation. As more firms crowded into the field, they took advantage
of the possibility of filing multiple suits in a single state court, usually
Delaware’s Chancery Court. Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ perceptions that this court
had become less hospitable to their cases (combined with legal innovations
in Delaware procedures) in turn led those firms to move further afield to file
163

See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“There are
sound policy reasons for this Court to police against shirking by representative counsel.”); In re Cox
Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 640–42 (Del. Ch. 2005) (lowering the award of
attorneys’ fees in a successful shareholder litigation to something that can more “reasonably be
justified”).
164
See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 2 (reporting Delaware Chancellor’s promotion of
Delaware courts “as a friendly haven for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring meritorious class action[s]”).
165
Telephone Interview with plaintiffs’ lawyers (July 25, 2011).
166
See infra Part II.C.4.
167
Heidi Moore, Double Trouble, THE DEAL (May 10, 2004) (announcing the breakup of the
Milberg Weiss firm) (available at LexisNexis); see generally Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality,
34 J. CORP. L. 153, 154 n.1, 160–61 (2008) (detailing the firm’s split, the criminal prosecution of four of
the firm’s partners, and the firm’s $75 million settlement with the government).
168
“When Lerach Coughlin, the predecessor of Robbins Geller, split off from Milberg, they said, as
their business plan, we are going to sue elsewhere. We’re not going to sue in Delaware.” Transcript of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the Court’s Ruling at 19, In re Compellent Techs.,
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6084-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011).
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mergers and acquisitions representative suits in other states’ courts and
federal courts. This form of forum shopping resulted, which may have
increased litigation agency costs.
3. Traditional Derivative Suits.—Traditional derivative litigation is
the third important type of representative litigation that generates multiple
suits. These cases raise state law breach of fiduciary duty claims by
directors and officers. Typically, these claims include breach of the duties
of loyalty—including good faith—and care, as well as other state law
issues. Derivative suits are the traditional form of representative litigation
and are used to attack directors or officers who are engaging in conflict-ofinterest transactions with the corporation or are taking a corporate
opportunity belonging to the corporation. A recent prominent example is
the options backdating scandal, in which a number of large corporations
were found to have provided their executives with options to buy stock on
dates and terms that were backdated so that the option appeared to have
been granted before a subsequent (favorable) event had occurred.169 In
reality, since the option price was not set until after a significant financial
event had occurred, backdating increased the likely value of the option,
since it was closer to a sure bet.170 Research by professors and news services
led to government regulatory investigations that revealed wide-ranging
misbehavior and resulted in a series of derivative suits to recover benefits
that insiders unjustly obtained from the corporation.171
As a substantive matter, these traditional derivative cases will be
determined by the law of the state of incorporation. As with our prior
category, deal litigation, the forum for litigation could be the state courts of
the state of incorporation (as above, often Delaware), a court in another
state where the company is headquartered, or any federal court if
appropriate jurisdiction can be established.
In contrast to deal cases, there is no pending transaction
overshadowing the litigation that makes time so important and litigation
more rapid. Moreover, litigation in these derivative cases is likely to be
more complex than in deal cases. Different procedural requirements, such
as the requirement for demand on the directors to bring suit, means that
there can be more pretrial motions, which could deter certain types of
plaintiffs’ law firms. These two factors, the less pressing impact of time and
169

See Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1362–63 (discussing data relating to option backdating

cases).
170

M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (2007) (providing an example of a typical backdating transaction and
how it permits directors and executives to receive stock that is “in-the-money immediately”).
171
See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1;
see also Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 360 n.60 (Del. Ch. 2007) (detailing scholarly research on the
backdating controversy); Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate
Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 235 (2009) (explaining how a Wall
Street Journal piece led to the investigation of 130 companies for backdating).
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the greater likelihood of more intense pretrial litigation, may also dampen
the impact of reverse auctions by reducing the range of plaintiffs’ law firms
likely to bring litigation.172 These litigation factors will interact with law
firm size and resources to affect what type of law firm files these cases.173
A plaintiff law firm in these suits may choose a forum to gain a more
attractive platform for prosecuting and settling the litigation, as discussed
above, or because of procedural differences in how different jurisdictions
will handle the derivative suits. For example, there may be differences in
discovery rules among jurisdictions.174 Delaware has long followed a pattern
of declining to permit discovery in derivative cases prior to a motion to
dismiss.175 This rule mirrors the PSLRA, but actually predates that federal
rule. If other states do not have such a rule, they may present a more
attractive venue.176 States may also differ on how they approach demand
requirements under derivative suits. Delaware, for example, requires
demand unless it is excused,177 so that much of the litigation is over whether
the requirements for demand excusal were met. Other states require
universal demand.178 Some states also require plaintiffs to post bond for the
likely expenses incurred by the defendants in responding to the lawsuit.179
Once an initial suit has been filed, either in Delaware or the state of the
corporation’s headquarters, there are sometimes suits filed in other
jurisdictions. If the initial plaintiff made its forum selection based on
procedural advantages, one wonders what motivates the second plaintiff to
file in a procedurally less favorable jurisdiction. We think that there are at
least two factors that are important here: first, the Delaware lead plaintiff
provision may shut out smaller, newer plaintiffs’ law firms from that state,
and second, the potential for getting a part of a global settlement, or
conducting a reverse auction, may support filing elsewhere.
Armour, Black, and Cheffins have developed the most complete data
set of backdating cases. They find 165 firms with either federal or state
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See supra Part I.A.4.a (discussing plaintiffs’ firms).
Firms that lack the resources to litigate these intensive matters may choose not to file them.
However, it is also possible that weaker firms may simply file weaker cases and seek to settle them
cheaply.
174
See Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1379 (discussing Delaware as part of a minority of
states that stay discovery in a derivative action until a motion to dismiss has been heard).
175
See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 & n.10 (Del. 1993) (addressing alternative
means for a plaintiff to plead with particularity).
176
See Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1379 (stating that Delaware is one of a minority of
states that stay discovery in a derivative suit).
177
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
178
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2011) (requiring universal demand on directors prior to
bringing a derivative suit). The MBCA lists states with similar statutes requiring universal demand. See
2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.40, at 7-294 to -95 (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2011).
179
See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012).
173

1785

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

lawsuits relating to backdating, with Delaware-incorporated firms
accounting for 77% of the defendant companies.180
Litigation filing patterns for this set of cases differ from those
discussed above. For backdating cases, about half of the suits were brought
in federal court, 40% in the courts of states other than Delaware, and only
11% in Delaware.181 According to Erickson, these suits are not likely to be
associated with parallel securities fraud class actions, although they are
usually associated with SEC investigations.182
Both Erickson and Armour, Black, and Cheffins report that backdating
cases frequently produce cash awards in settlements. Erickson finds cash
settlements in 17 of her 40 public company backdating cases filed in federal
courts, as compared to 2 of 101 other, non-backdating-related derivative
suits.183 Armour, Black, and Cheffins report a somewhat smaller percentage
of backdating suits producing cash recoveries (52 of 165) in their
backdating sample.184
These backdating suits look more like the ones in our earlier study of
derivative suits filed in Delaware, where we found derivative suits often
raised conflicts of interest related to a particular transaction.185 There we
also found some derivative suits, brought on Caremark grounds,186 alleging
breaches of directors’ duty of care where the board had not uncovered
problems that led to a regulatory investigation and a large fine. Such claims
could be brought in the Delaware Chancery Court, but the Caremark
standard, while amorphous, has not been interpreted by the Delaware
judges to impose much in the way of personal liability on directors or
officers.187 More often, these cases seem to be brought in state courts in the
headquarters state of the company, although the more recent data sets do
not provide data on this question.188 In these cases, there appear to be
relatively weak claims that can proceed in tandem with negotiations with

180

Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1363.
Id.
182
Erickson, supra note 2, at 1759, 1810 & n.228 (stating that stock option suits were filed
exclusively against large public companies).
183
Id. at 1798.
184
Delaware Balancing, supra note 4, at 1390.
185
Derivative Lawsuits, supra note 5, at 1786 (“[T]he bulk of all public company derivative suits
challenge conflict of interest transactions . . . .”).
186
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
187
Some federal courts have been more willing to find fiduciary violations under state law in a care
setting, as for example, in In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803–09 (7th Cir.
2003) (using Delaware precedents to interpret Illinois corporate law and finding complaint sufficiently
pled director action outside the business judgment rule). As a result, we would expect to see more such
cases filed in federal court in the same circuit where plaintiffs could take advantage of the favorable
interpretation of Delaware law.
188
Most state courts do not have electronic filing systems, which makes research about state court
derivative actions outside of Delaware very difficult. See supra note 115.
181
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the Department of Justice or states’ attorneys general, and which often
result in corporate governance settlements.189
These traditional derivative suits are probably the most stable set of
cases of all of the representative litigation groups. There has been little
change in the underlying set of legal and procedural rules for derivative
litigation in the past twenty years, although pressure on other areas of
representative litigation seems to have resulted in new firms moving into
the field. While the increased number of smaller plaintiffs’ law firms could
lead to more multijurisdictional derivative litigation, we do not presently
have good data about the size or existence of this potential problem. As a
result, we cannot make strong statements about litigation agency cost issues
at this point.
II. DEFINING THE MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM CONFRONTING
REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND HOW IT SHOULD
BE ADDRESSED
Shareholder litigation, with its multiple sources of legal rules and its
multiple agents desiring to speak for the group, has long generated multiple
lawsuits arising from the same underlying activity. Each participant in the
process plays a role in this: the plaintiffs’ law firms have incentives to seek
out different courts for suits arising out of the same transactions, the
defendants have little reason to object to them doing so, and the courts may
indirectly encourage this practice by competing to get these cases. Such
suits have always presented a tradeoff between the desirable check of
possible misuse of the broad powers corporate law provides managers and
the costs of litigation agents diverting the process for their own benefit.
Recent articles and press coverage of deal litigation have focused on the
increase in the number of deals attracting litigation as the latest presentation
of this conflict and have proposed a variety of reforms.190
In this Part, we use the theory of shareholder litigation and description
of the various litigation patterns developed in Part I to address the particular
context of multijurisdictional shareholder litigation. We begin in section A
with some initial comments about the nature of the problem as revealed by
the studies described in the previous Part. We see the primary focus not as
the increase in the number of deals attracting litigation, but rather as an
189

Erickson, supra note 2, at 1804.
See, e.g., Delaware Cases, supra note 4 (addressing an increase in litigation outside Delaware);
Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 42; Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multijurisdictional
Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2012) (noting
that deal litigation has become “a routine facet” of a deal); Dionne Searcey & Ashby Jones, First the
Merger; Then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, at C1 (citing an “ever-increasing number of
lawsuits” that threaten to “increase the cost of the transactions”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Why Merger
Lawsuits Don’t Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2011, at B9 (citing a record number of deals lawsuits but
noting that “legal experts warn that the chances [litigants] will succeed in stopping a deal or receiving a
significant payday are minimal”).
190
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increase in the amount of multijurisdiction litigation. This framing of the
problem highlights the need to include analysis of traditional issues from
the larger field of procedural law, such as forum selection and forum
shopping, in this analysis of shareholder litigation. Our discussion in
section B develops how the particular characteristics of shareholder
litigation shift and narrow the impact of these procedural issues as
compared to litigation generally, shifting the focus more to attorneys rather
than plaintiffs. In multijurisdictional deal litigation, the primary economic
motivation is to provide an entry to a second set of attorneys seeking to get
a piece of a pool of attorneys’ fees in deals expected to generate attorneys’
fees; it is not to generate strike suits. Section C provides an exploration of
different solutions currently being debated to change this multijurisdictional
shareholder litigation pattern—judicial, legislative, and through private
ordering by the various corporate constituencies. Procedural concerns about
forum selection and forum shopping play out somewhat differently in the
shareholder litigation context than in litigation generally. Our theory
suggests a solution that focuses on judicial cooperation as the most effective
response among the multiple solutions being debated.
A. What the Pattern of Shareholder Litigation Tells Us About the Problem
Shareholder litigation has long raised the possibility of strike suits.
Some litigation agency costs can be accepted as a necessary tradeoff
between having an effective litigation vehicle to permit courts to monitor
possibly injurious management behavior and balancing additional
constraints to check disincentives that can arise for plaintiffs in shareholder
suits. We begin with three takeaways from our theory (discussed in the
prior Part) and the empirical data generated about shareholder litigation,
which narrows and reshapes both the problem and the preferred solutions.
First, the increase in the percentage of deals attracting litigation has
gotten the most attention from the press,191 but the best data available does
not indicate any pattern of increase in the total number of deals that attract
litigation.192 In a recent working paper, Professors Cain and Davidoff report
hand-collected data showing that the total number of deals attracting
litigation changed very little from 2006 to 2011.193 However, in the postfinancial crisis period, the number of deals dropped substantially.194 The
combination of these two factors means that the percentage of deals
191

See supra note 190.
There is no good data source on the level of multijurisdictional derivative litigation. See supra
note 115.
193
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31 tbl.1 (showing that in 2006 and 2007, 97 deals per year
attracted litigation, whereas 2008 (50 deals) and 2009 (60 deals) showed declines in the number of deals
attracting suits, and 2010 had 101 deals with litigation); see also DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 159,
at 2 tbl.1 (showing through 2011 that the deals litigated have been right at Cain & Davidoff’s average
for the previous six years).
194
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31 tbl.1.
192
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attracting litigation increased markedly in 2009 and 2010.195 This increased
percentage of cases attracting litigation could be a problem if additional
sums, such as extra attorneys’ fees, were paid to settle cases in which there
was no real benefit to shareholders, or if it resulted in lower quality cases
being brought.196 The rise in the number of settlements that provide only
additional disclosure (and attorneys’ fees) could be indicia of this.197
However, lawsuit quality is difficult to assess and could be the result of a
large number of factors for which we do not yet have empirical results.198
Overall, Cain and Davidoff report a mean amount of attorneys’ fees paid in
settled cases in the last year of their study that is below the six-year average
and a median that is slightly above the six-year average.199
Cain and Davidoff report that the mean number of suits per case
doubled from 2005 to 2009 and 2010, and the percentage of deals with
multijurisdictional litigation increased substantially during those same
years.200 Taken together, this finding and the previous ones indicate that the
problem we are addressing is an increase in the amount of
multijurisdictional litigation and not an increase in the number of deals
attracting litigation.
195

Id. (reporting a strong increase in the percentage of deals from 2005 (38.7%) to 2011 (84.2%)).
Other papers report a similar increase in the percentage of deals attracting litigation without addressing
the number of suits. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 4, at 148 tbls.1 & 2 (showing that 82% of public
mergers were accompanied by some litigation in 2009 and 2010).
196
Cain & Davidoff report outcome data for their sample, but it is not broken out by year with one
exception. They do find an increase in the number of disclosure-based settlements over their sample
period. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 34 tbl.2.
197
Cain & Davidoff’s data from 2005 to 2010 on the percentage of settlements that do not involve
disclosure claims only show a marked decline in this percentage after 2006. Id. Daines & Koumrian
show a similar percentage into 2011. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 159, at 12. Both show a much
higher percentage of settlements and settlements with only additional disclosure than we found in our
study of litigated merger deals in 1999 and 2000. See New Look, supra note 5, at 181 tbl.8.
198
If disclosure-only settlements are weaker settlements, which would be consistent with the lower
attorneys’ fees awards reported in these suits, this could indicate a decline in the quality of settlements
over the past few years. However, any such change could be a result of a large number of factors, such
as a change in deal quality or a shift in judicial attitudes toward disclosure-only settlements. No causal
link to multijurisdictional litigation has been established by any empirical studies. Furthermore, if
lawsuit quality is dropping, the courts have a number of techniques that they can employ to directly
address that problem, such as denying motions for expedited discovery, denying attorneys’ fees, or
outright dismissal of the action. See, e.g., Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite
and the Court’s Ruling at 11–14, Stourbridge Invs. LLC v. Bersoff, C.A. No. 7300-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar.
13, 2012) (denying expedited discovery in a disclosure-only settlement case “[g]iven the nature of the
complaint and its significant weaknesses . . . .”). Given their prominence, if the Delaware courts took the
lead in using such techniques against poor cases, other courts would be likely to follow suit.
199
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 34 tbl.2 (showing that mean attorneys’ fees in 2005 was
$1.77 million versus in 2010 when the mean value was $1.27 million; the median value in 2010 was
$595,000 against a six-year average of about $558,000); see also DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 159,
at 12 & fig.5 (showing similar fee data for 2010 and 2011—$1.2 million for a mean and between
$500,000 and $600,000 for a median attorneys’ fee award). Data concerning defendants’ attorneys’ fees
is not disclosed in settlements and remains private information so we cannot tell what, if any, impact the
increased percentage of deals being litigated has had on them.
200
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31.
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Second, these multijurisdictional cases all revolve around which court
will be applying the law of the state of incorporation and not around the
choice of law to be applied. As a result, these cases raise a narrower set of
issues than forum selection claims more generally. To be sure, different
courts in different jurisdictions may have slightly different ways of
interpreting the underlying legal principles of the state of incorporation, but
whether it is a state court in the defendant company’s headquarters state, a
federal court sitting in a diversity case (or deciding a pendent state law
claim), or the trial court in the state of incorporation, there is no dispute that
the internal affairs doctrine makes the law of the state of incorporation the
appropriate source for legal rules.201 At the same time, these cases raise
concerns more specific to corporate litigation, such as whether the state of
incorporation’s interest in determining its law should have a greater role
than in other forum selection contexts, and who in the corporation should be
able to make forum selection choices. We discuss these two points below.
Third, the lack of a method to consolidate all class action and
derivative cases arising out of the same set of facts also shapes the footprint
for possible solutions. There are federal procedural rules to permit federal
securities fraud class actions to be assembled before one judge,202 and when
multiple cases are filed within the courts of one state, consolidation orders
are widely used so that all discovery efforts will be processed efficiently
and motions can be decided with respect to the entire matter.203 However,
the rise in litigation that we trace in Part I mostly results from multiple
cases filed in different states, or in federal courts as well as state courts,
where the judicial system has no internal mechanism to ensure that all cases
wind up in front of one judge.
As we discuss more fully below, each of these points narrows both the
problem and the effectiveness of several of the proposed solutions. In the
remainder of this section, we show that this litigation does not raise the
traditional issues related to forum shopping but rather raises a new issue:
fee distribution litigation. That is, these cases are usually brought to give
the plaintiffs’ law firms filing them a claim to a place at the settlement table
and not because they offer the plaintiffs the traditional advantages of forum
shopping, such as a better choice of law or a judge perceived to be friendly
on the substantive law. We then test various potential judicial solutions
against this reality, finding that there are real limits to some of the
alternatives, leaving what some will find, perhaps, a surprising favorite.
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See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). The lead plaintiff and MDL provisions actually speak only to pretrial
matters, but that effectively covers all matters because few of these cases ever go to trial. See Cox et al.,
supra note 77, at 428.
203
See New Look, supra note 5, at 168.
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B. Multijurisdictional Representative Shareholder Litigation: Is It
Motivated by Traditional Forum Shopping Concerns?
The American legal system generally creates more than one legally
acceptable forum that can hear a case and gives the plaintiff the initial
choice of where to file. This protects the plaintiff’s ability to reach a
defendant in a court with jurisdiction, provides an option that can reduce
costs, and limits the possible discrimination of local courts against parties
from other jurisdictions. It also raises a countervailing inquiry: is the
plaintiff’s choice of a particular court merely forum selection, which is
necessary in all litigation, or is it forum shopping, which is frequently
condemned by courts and commentators?204 No clear point exists at which
forum selection becomes forum shopping.
To draw a meaningful line between the two, we need to define forum
shopping. In its broadest form, “[f]orum shopping is a plaintiff’s decision to
file a lawsuit in one court rather than another potentially available court.”205
However, this definition is too broad because it would render all forum
selection decisions forum shopping. More generally, forum shopping
requires that more than one court be available to resolve the plaintiff’s
claim and that the plaintiff “may be more likely to win . . . in some legal
systems than in others,” so as to create an incentive to forum shop.206 In
such a setting we would expect a plaintiff to choose the court with the
highest expected value for her claims (value of settlement minus costs),
which depends on the judge being willing to hear the case (implicating
issues related to personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and
proper venue) and on which jurisdiction’s laws will apply (choice of law
decisions).207 Forum shopping could be defined even more broadly to
include other types of differences between jurisdictions that may influence
substantive results, including the reputation of the judge likely to hear the
case, the likelihood of a favorable jury pool, prior judicial decisions or jury
verdicts in similar matters, and the convenience of the particular forum.208
Forum shopping is not limited to plaintiffs, either—defendants
frequently take actions to move cases to forums that they perceive as more
204

See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION § 1:01 (2d ed. 1999).
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 485
(2011). Other authors have taken a wider perspective on what constitutes forum shopping. See Debra
Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2006) (describing five basic types of
forum shopping as: (1) choosing between federal and state courts, (2) choices among different state
courts, (3) selecting among different substantive legal rules, (4) choosing among different procedural
rules, and (5) choices involving personal or subjective matters).
206
Whytock, supra note 205, at 486.
207
Choice of law differences can be because of differences in state law, substantive legal rules, or
choice of law rules.
208
See Bassett, supra note 205, at 350. While this definition is more accurate in capturing the
concept of strategic litigation, it is more far-reaching than what most courts and commentators have in
mind when they discuss forum shopping.
205
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favorable.209 Defendants have a broad set of standard forum shopping
techniques, such as removing cases from state to federal court, filing
motions asking judges to stay one action in favor of another action, making
challenges to a court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction or subject
matter jurisdiction, using a forum non conveniens motion to claim that a
particular venue is improper, and, in some cases, filing declaratory
judgment actions to fix a particular venue for the litigation before a plaintiff
can file a complaint. Forum selection clauses in contracts or corporate
governing documents (most often inserted by defendants) are another
device for forum shopping, as they ensure the defendant’s choice of the
applicable court, legal rules, and choice of law rules, no matter how
inconvenient or potentially dispositive of the plaintiff’s case.210
1. Forum Choice as Part of Core Procedural Rules.—One of our
favorite Civil Procedure teachers tells her 1L students each year that
litigation is like a chess match: each side has certain moves that it is
allowed to make, and the other side responds as it deems appropriate based
on the moves permitted under the rules. In chess, white moves first and can
make certain moves; in most litigation, the plaintiff moves first and has
certain permissible forums. Just as in chess, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should be respected so long as it chooses a fair forum within the set of
possible forums.211 The fact that the rules of civil procedure allow the
plaintiff to choose, among the multiple permissible forums, where to file a
suit is one of the strongest arguments in favor of forum shopping.212
The fact that plaintiffs may choose one forum over another does not
mean that they are cheating in the litigation “chess game” so long as they
are playing within the procedural and substantive rules. Forum choice is
only one of the rules of the chess match, and, while some aspects of the
rules may favor plaintiffs, others favor defendants. For example, plaintiffs
must pay the costs associated with researching and filing a case, spend the
time, and overcome significant informational barriers to uncover proof of
alleged wrongs committed by the defendants—information that is generally
in the defendants’ sole possession. In the corporate litigation context,
defendants have many other advantages, such as the high procedural
barriers for pleading cases without access to discovery.213 Businesses have
already been given a significant forum shopping opportunity, as
entrepreneurs and managers make the initial choice of where to
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CASAD, supra note 204, §§ 1.06–1.08.
See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and
Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 360–61 (1992).
211
See Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A
Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. L.J. 231, 249 (1990–91).
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See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 202 (2000).
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See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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incorporate.214 In many cases, as noted above, they may also choose forum
selection clauses that funnel all disputes into one court. In short, plaintiffs’
ability to select a forum is just a small aspect of a procedural structure that,
as a whole, does not favor plaintiffs over defendants.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s attorney has a legal obligation to choose the
best forum for her client.215 Ethical rules require a lawyer to zealously
pursue the interests of her client within the bounds of the law. This includes
selecting the most favorable forum for her client when it furthers the
client’s interests, so long as the lawyer is not trying to delay, harass, or
maliciously injure the defendant.216
2. Common Arguments Against Forum Shopping.—Arguments
against forum shopping are long standing and can apply in the corporate
context. Critics of forum shopping frequently argue that the U.S. Supreme
Court has condemned forum shopping, citing the classic 1938 case of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.217 There the Court took aim at one form of forum
shopping: plaintiffs’ efforts to choose between federal and state courts
based on federal judges using federal common law to interpret state
substantive law.218 Although it condemned such state–federal forum
shopping, it did not address state–state forum shopping. In fact, several
other Supreme Court cases have accepted forum shopping between different
state courts without comment and, in some cases, have even endorsed it.219
A second common complaint about forum shopping is that it leads to
inconsistent judicial outcomes as litigants seek a more favorable substantive
law or a more agreeable decider of the same substantive law.220 “Forum
shopping suggests either a distrust of the [legal] system’s capacity to
redress wrongs or an effort to obtain more than one’s entitlement under the
prevailing rules.”221 However, in the American legal system, the political
reality is that we shop for law in local legislatures, in Congress, and in the
courts.222 Furthermore, legal decisionmakers, such as judges, lawyers, and
legislators are influenced by a variety of factors, both personal and political.
Legal outcomes are invariably influenced by these differences.
214

See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1692 (1990).
Bassett, supra note 205, at 370–73; Note, supra note 214, at 1690–91.
216
See Note, supra note 214, at 1690 nn.99–100.
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304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 641 (1974).
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See Bassett, supra note 205, at 362.
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Note, supra note 214, at 1682–83 (giving examples of Supreme Court cases accepting forum
shopping); see also Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of
Federalism: A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 833, 834 (1985) (explaining that state–state forum shopping is a “permissible activity of all shrewd
litigants”).
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See Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 42; Nathan, supra note 101, at 113.
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Note, supra note 214, at 1685.
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Bassett, supra note 205, at 387–88.
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A third complaint is that forum shopping creates unnecessary costs and
inconvenience for defendants, as it may result in litigation in a forum that is
distant from most relevant witnesses and documents. In this regard, note
that restrictions on personal jurisdiction limit the number of places where
defendants can be sued. Furthermore, procedural rules provide relief if
defendants can demonstrate true inconvenience—they can move the court
to transfer or dismiss the case under the forum non conveniens doctrine or
through a motion to transfer venue.223 Finally, if the rights that plaintiffs
seek to enforce are ones that society values, forum shopping may be
socially beneficial because it facilitates the provision of those remedies and
results in greater enforcement of the law, even if there is a modest
additional expense.224
One further concern expressed about forum shopping is that it affects a
state’s ability to be autonomous. “[A] state’s choice of policy may be
undermined by the ability of litigants to seek a different forum.”225 So, for
example, if a state chooses to have a short statute of limitations for certain
types of legal claims, but a plaintiff can avoid that statute by filing in a
different state, the first state’s policies are circumvented. One response to
this concern, raised in a civil rights context, is that plaintiffs may view
themselves as being part of a larger community than a single state whose
claims affect a wider body of citizens.226 Respecting plaintiffs’ alternative
permissible choices for filing complaints reflects the values that they are
seeking to enforce.
3.

Situating Shareholder Litigation Within the Forum Shopping
Debate.—The forum shopping debate is somewhat different in the
context of shareholder representative litigation than in the larger universe of
litigation. In an important sense, the space of the debate is narrower. M&A
deal litigation cases are usually multijurisdictional filings that all seek to
apply the same substantive law, thus eliminating one large reason for forum
shopping. No one usually disputes that the law of the state of incorporation
(e.g., Delaware) applies to these cases. Rather, the claim seems to be that a
non-Delaware court (and possibly jury) is more likely to be overly friendly
to plaintiffs, or to a particular plaintiff, in the manner in which it applies
Delaware law.227 “Friendly” in the corporate governance context could
223

28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006).
See Note, supra note 214, at 1692–93; see also George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum
Shopping—Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 671–72
(1993) (describing forum shopping as an acceptable incentive when it comes to furthering societal
goals).
225
Note, supra note 214, at 1693.
226
See id. at 1694.
227
Nathan, supra note 101, at 113 (“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers, particularly those with weak cases, hope
that other, less experienced judges will misapply Delaware law, that the greater uncertainty of the
outcome will increase the settlement value of the litigation . . . .”).
224
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mean that the other state has a different view than Delaware as to what
breadth of shareholder challenges to management discretion constitutes
good corporate policy. If that were the case, we would expect to see
correlations between forum selection and such policies, data that has not yet
been developed. Plaintiffs continue to file cases in Delaware courts and in
the courts of the headquarters state. There have been notable examples of
Delaware policies favoring management228 and the continuing room that the
Delaware Supreme Court has given management to use defensive tactics
like poison pills.229 But almost all of the other states quickly followed
Delaware’s statutory exculpation approach, and some of the larger
commercial states have gone beyond Delaware in authorizing anti-takeover
defensive tactics and deferring to corporate directors’ business judgment.230
A more refined (or cynical) version of this claim is that plaintiffs file
good cases in Delaware and bad cases elsewhere, hoping that the Delaware
courts will rule in their favor in strong cases and that other states’ courts
will not detect the flaws in the weak ones.231 While there is at least
superficial plausibility to this claim, it is not without flaws. For one thing, it
is an empirical assertion that remains unproven. Furthermore, judges care
about the merits of the cases they decide, and it cannot be true that
multijurisdictional filings which are based on the same facts, theories, and
substantive law are strong in a Delaware court but weak elsewhere. As we
discuss below, we believe that there are different forces driving these filings
than those commonly associated with forum shopping.
Overall, forum shopping in the corporate setting seems less likely to
raise “the spectre of an outcome-altering choice” that often drives forum
shopping policy discussion in litigation contexts generally.232 First, for the
reasons noted above, all judges will apply Delaware law and each of the
relevant courts have equally valid claims to personal jurisdiction over
defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In terms of venue,

228

For example, Delaware’s legislature effectively overruled the liability-creating rule of Smith v.
Van Gorkom by enacting a statutory exculpation provision. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2011); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors breached their
fiduciary duty in approving a merger, which led to the legislative addition of § 102(b)(7), which permits
corporations to exculpate their directors).
229
See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 603–06 (Del. 2010) (upholding the
legitimacy of a poison pill with a 4.99% trigger).
230
See, e.g., 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1715(b) (West 1995) (directors are not required to regard the
interest of any particular group as paramount).
231
Nathan, supra note 101, at 113. The claim is that non-Delaware judges will “misapply”
Delaware law, systematically leading to greater uncertainty in outcomes and increasing settlement value
for some cases. Such claims have yet to be demonstrated empirically. A related claim is that defendants
are no longer willing to file motions to dismiss in Delaware because they do not wish to drive deal cases
to other forums. See Micheletti & Parker, supra note 190, at 12. Cain and Davidoff estimate that
“Delaware courts dismiss fewer cases when cases migrate towards other jurisdictions.” Cain &
Davidoff, supra note 36, at 6.
232
Bassett, supra note 205, at 351 (arguing that many such claims are unsubstantiated).
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the standard remedy for improper venue is to ask the court to transfer or
dismiss the case pursuant to forum non conveniens. In almost all cases, the
convenience of the parties (e.g., the location of the documents) cuts against
Delaware taking these cases and in favor of the defendant’s headquarters
state. Delaware does have a legitimate argument that it has a strong interest
in ensuring that its corporate laws are properly interpreted, a corporate law
application of the state-autonomy argument described above. As noted
earlier, commentators have observed that Delaware is losing its cases and
have raised concerns that this alleged decline could adversely impact
Delaware’s ability to market its corporate law product.233 However, while
Delaware’s law is as close to a national corporate law as exists, it is plainly
not the only state that has an economic interest in the many corporations
that are incorporated there but which have their physical operations
elsewhere. Particularly in mergers and acquisitions, where the
disappearance of a target corporation may have an adverse economic impact
on another jurisdiction, it seems odd to say that only Delaware can decide a
dispute over the terms of such a takeover. Furthermore, while the Delaware
Supreme Court always has the last word on the meaning of its law,234 the
U.S. Supreme Court has not permitted any state to generally exclude
another state from hearing cases under the first state’s laws for which the
other state has jurisdiction.235
Finally, there are strong reasons to believe that defendants are
engaging in forum shopping themselves. Savitt motions, which ask the
Delaware court to get all courts with pending litigation to agree to stay their
actions in favor of the Delaware forum, are a method of forum shopping.236
The defendant is trying to ensure that all cases are brought before its
preferred forum, the Delaware Chancery Court. At the more extreme end of
the spectrum of forum shopping, corporate defendants are adopting bylaw
and charter provisions that will ensure that Delaware hears all fiduciary
duty cases brought against directors of Delaware corporations, or in some
cases, that the board of directors has the power to decide where the case
may be brought. This is nothing more than a type of forum shopping by
defendants, who are trying to change the rules of the chess game to be more
to their liking.
233

See Delaware Cases, supra note 4.
When in doubt, other states’ courts can ask the Delaware Supreme Court to determine questions
of Delaware law because Delaware’s constitution grants that court jurisdiction to hear questions of law
certified to it by the highest appellate court of any state. DEL. CONST. art IV, § 11(8).
235
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359–60 (1914) (holding Georgia was not
bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give effect to an exclusive venue provision);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (1971).
236
Defendants are seeking to move the plaintiffs out of their chosen forums into a single court,
frequently Delaware. These motions have become increasingly common. C. Barr Flinn & Kathaleen St.
J. McCormick, The Delaware Court of Chancery Endorses One Forum Motions as a Solution to
Multijurisdictional Litigation (Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Del.), Fall 2001,
available at http://www.youngconaway.com//files//upload/CorporateFall2011.pdf.
234
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We do not claim that there are no differences between the Delaware
courts and other states’ courts; rather, our argument is that these differences
are not the real drivers of multijurisdictional litigation. As we discuss in the
next section, we think other forces are at work.
Moreover, in the end, all of this discussion takes place against the
backdrop of a long-running debate over the merits of representative
litigation and its value as a constraint on possible abuses of management
discretion.237 Critics label behavior as forum shopping when they want to
paint it as unsavory and contrary to public policy, but they avoid that label
if they think the reasons for forum selection are reasonable and justified—a
difference that often involves a subjective assessment of the litigant’s
motives.238 This would not be the first time such claims have been made
against shareholder litigation, and, undoubtedly, it will not be the last.
Forum shopping principles cannot resolve this issue without bringing in
these larger questions of corporate governance.
4.

Fee
Distribution
Litigation
as
an
Alternative
Explanation.—Multijurisdictional litigation in shareholder lawsuits
raises different, narrower concerns than traditional forum shopping. There
are no differences in the underlying legal standards or choice of law rules
being used by the different courts hearing these cases. Plaintiffs do not
appear to be seeking a friendly jury.239 Nor is it clear that the Delaware
courts either favor or disfavor large attorneys’ fees awards for plaintiffs as
they have made conflicting statements about this issue.240 While there are
some procedural differences between state courts, such as differences in the
availability of discovery or ease of scheduling preliminary injunction
motions, the traditional concerns about forum shopping do not seem to
explain the explosion of this form of litigation.
In this section, we want to offer a somewhat different, and we think
more accurate, description of why there has been a large uptick in the
number of multijurisdictional cases without a corresponding increase in the
number of deals that are attracting litigation. We believe that these suits are
really what we will call “fee distribution litigation”—meaning that these
cases are filed after suits are filed in another jurisdiction in an effort to give
a second set of plaintiffs’ law firms a seat at the settlement table and an
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New Look, supra note 5, at 148–65.
Note, supra note 214, at 1683–84.
239
As a court of equity, the Delaware Chancery Court does not permit the possibility of a jury trial,
so plaintiffs may forum shop to be in front of a jury, or the threat of a potential jury verdict might
provide some leverage to the plaintiffs in settlement negotiations. Michelletti & Parker, supra note 190,
at 7. Almost no cases go to trial, and current settlement practices do not seem to reflect such a
difference. New Look, supra note 5, at 177 tbl.6 (showing that among all cases resolved at the time of
the study, no deal cases went to trial in 1999 and 2000). In other words, there is no evidence that
defendants pay a higher price to settle these cases in jurisdictions that might hold a jury trial.
240
See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
238

1797

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

opportunity to reallocate the pool of attorneys’ fees that may be awarded.
We argue that fee distribution litigation only requires that the plaintiffs find
a court that satisfies the basic jurisdictional and venue requirements for
filing and that has a judge who will, at least initially, agree to hear the case
even when the defendants argue in favor of dismissal.241
We start from the premise that only certain deals are likely to produce
settlement and attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers. As we have shown in
other work, the types of mergers and acquisitions transactions that are most
likely to attract litigation are large deals, hostile deals, control shareholder
squeeze-outs, and deals with cash financing.242 Plaintiffs’ law firms file suit
on these deals because experience shows that these are the cases most likely
to lead to beneficial settlements or at least settlements sufficiently beneficial
for a court to award attorneys’ fees for bringing the suit. At any given point
in time, however, there are only so many of these cases, and, hence, the
number of deals that attract litigation (and lead to positive fee awards) is
limited. This may explain why the number of deals attracting lawsuits is
relatively constant over time in the Cain and Davidoff data.243
Enter the new, smaller plaintiffs’ law firms that we described above.244
These new plaintiffs’ law firms can do what all of the other plaintiffs’ law
firms do and only file suit challenging the deals that other firms challenge.
However, they are smaller and less well-known. They are therefore less
likely to be one of the plaintiffs’ law firm consortiums that are frequently
charged with litigating these cases if they are filed, for example, in the
Delaware Chancery Court. Delaware’s version of the lead plaintiff
provision means that the key roles in these representative suits are more
likely to go to one (or a few) of the more established and larger plaintiffs’
law firms.245 To succeed in the business, new firms must therefore find a
way to obtain a slice of the attorneys’ fees that are being generated from the
limited pool of good, settlement-worthy cases.
As good lawyers, they have determined that they are more likely to be
able to control the litigation and potentially get paid if they file suit in a
legally acceptable alternative jurisdiction where other law firms have not
already done so. Given the jurisdiction and venue rules that we discussed in
the previous section, there is almost always at least one other permissible
state court where such a suit can be filed and litigated without violating the
rules of civil procedure, so long as the judge will, at least initially, permit
241

Defendants do not seem to file transfer motions or motions to dismiss in these cases. See New
Look, supra note 5, at 176.
242
Litigation in Mergers, supra note 5, at 3.
243
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 31 tbl.1.
244
See supra Part I.A.4.a.
245
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Litigation (July 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
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the plaintiffs to maintain their case if the defendants file objections. If the
larger, more established plaintiffs’ law firms choose to file suit in Delaware,
the state of the target company’s incorporation, then the new kids on the
block can bring their action in the courts of the state in which the target
company is headquartered.246 This would explain the observed big increase
in multijurisdictional litigation.
However, there is one more step in the process: the new firms need to
have some way to force defendants to include them in any settlement that
they reach with the older, more established firms. Let us add to the mix,
then, the fact that defendants generally insist on global settlements of all
litigation related to a common fact pattern, whether it is filed in one court or
many, and whether it is deal-related or a derivative claim.247 In a global
settlement, the defendant gets a release of all claims, actual or potential, that
could be brought by the shareholders of the company in any forum. In our
example, this means that the defendants will want to settle the litigation in
both jurisdictions—the state of incorporation and the state of
headquarters—to be assured that any settlement will finally put to rest all
possible claims in the various cases. This is what gives the new firms
leverage to get themselves included in the settlement negotiations: if the
older plaintiffs’ firms do not include them, then they can refuse to settle
their cases, or even worse, offer to settle them more cheaply in a reverse
auction.248 Facing this threat, and knowing that the defendants will not agree
in most circumstances to partial settlements, the older firms are forced to
negotiate with the newer ones over the allocation of attorneys’ fees in any
settlement.
5. The Costs and Benefits of Fee Distribution Litigation.—On
balance, is fee distribution litigation harmful? There are at least two kinds
of benefits that are created by this form of multijurisdictional litigation.
First, it preserves the traditional jurisdictional and venue rules for forum
selection that apply in all other areas of the law. To return to our earlier
chess analogy, it still allows white to move first in any manner permitted by
the rules of the game. Second, this form of litigation preserves other states’
ability to influence the business and affairs of corporations headquartered in
their states. As the law stands today, the Delaware courts have a quasimonopoly over the future growth of the corporate law that affects public
companies. There are some advantages to this quasi-monopoly, such as
predictability and certainty of outcome in most cases provided by judges
with expertise. Yet, one does not have to believe in the race to the bottom to
246

This process could be reversed if the larger, better established firms select the target’s
headquarters state as their preferred forum, thus leading the smaller firms to go to the courts of the state
of incorporation. However, the scenario described in the text is traditionally the more common one.
247
See Kazanoff, supra note 76, at 43 (“[D]efense counsel almost always assert the ‘all-we-careabout-is-one-forum position’ . . . .”); Michelletti & Parker, supra note 190, at 12 n.41.
248
See discussion infra Part II.C.1.

1799

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

see that there can be too much of a good thing. Multijurisdictional litigation
gives other states’ courts a channel to articulate their states’ interests in
these cases.
What about the costs? We note first that the defendants’ costs for
settling these cases appear relatively unaffected.249 A substantial number of
shareholder litigation cases are dismissed with no settlement and very little
litigation activity.250 Almost all of the settlements reported by Cain and
Davidoff are based on increased disclosures being made to the class of
affected shareholders, so that any direct costs from these settlements (such
as greater deal-consideration payments) are unlikely solely because more
cases arising out of the same transaction are settled at the same time.251 As
to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards,252 multijurisdictional global settlements
could conceivably cost defendants more than settlements in one court, but
they may not; defendants will push back against paying more. It is also
possible that more suits would generate more instances in which attorneys’
fees are paid with no benefit to shareholders, a traditional concern of those
worried about strike suits, but the studies of the increase in
multijurisdictional litigation have not yet shown that.253 Instead, what we do
see is litigation to shape how the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee award will be
divided amongst the plaintiffs’ law firms that are engaged in the litigation.
While the answer to this question matters a lot to those firms, it is of much
less concern to society and would need to be balanced by the possible
deterrence of meritorious suits because other plaintiffs could free ride on
the work done by one plaintiffs’ firm, thereby reducing the first firm’s
incentives. Certainly, any solution to this distributional problem should not
be an expensive and difficult one to implement.
To finish the social welfare analysis, we need to examine whether
these extra cases arising out of the same transaction result in duplicative
discovery costs and duplicative motions resolved at the cost of judicial
resources and attorney time. The best empirical evidence is from the deal
cases and shows that not much discovery is taken in most deal cases and
few pretrial dispositive motions are filed and briefed.254 Moreover, if
249

We are not claiming that there are no costs associated with multijurisdictional litigation. For
example, Cain and Davidoff provide some evidence that Delaware has a higher dismissal rate than other
jurisdictions, but that it dismisses fewer cases when they are filed in multiple jurisdictions. See Cain &
Davidoff, supra note 36, at 5–6. If other states are not dismissing these cases, then there may be more
cases settled, which, all other things being equal, could raise the defendants’ litigation-related costs.
250
New Look, supra note 5, at 176, 189.
251
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 33 (finding that some settlements do involve an increase in
the deal consideration, but that there is no evidence that the amount of the increase depends on the
number of cases being settled).
252
As we noted earlier, there is no publicly available information about defendants’ attorneys’ fees
that would allow us to make any factual determination about changes to them.
253
Cain and Davidoff’s data are the best available at this point, but they do not establish any causal
relationship between multijurisdictional litigation and weaker cases being filed.
254
New Look, supra note 5, at 189.
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discovery practice is de facto to conduct all discovery on a consolidated
basis across jurisdictions, and only one preliminary injunction motion is
scheduled per transaction, then the cost increases associated with
multijurisdictional litigation, while positive, may be relatively small. And
last but not least, we must consider the court’s time and efforts: with
multijurisdictional litigation, more than one court must be involved in every
case, and this undoubtedly imposes some costs on the judiciary. However,
most of the time, judges are not being asked to decide weighty issues of
corporate law, or even of civil procedure, but rather to manage some
preliminary discovery motion practice and to resolve law firm jockeying for
lead positions in the litigation.255 Relatively few judicial resources are likely
to be expended in this type of work, and those resources are being provided
by courts in other states that are willingly choosing to assume jurisdiction
over a case that could otherwise be litigated in Delaware.
To sum up, this type of litigation is different because it is largely about
dividing up the attorneys’ fee awards that are made in a limited number of
settlement-worthy cases. For that reason, we think that the new
multijurisdictional cases being filed are best described as fee distribution
litigation. They do not contribute much to the resolution of the main cases
being filed, nor do they appear to generate much in the way of additional
costs.256 We agree, therefore, with the mainstream belief that there is a
problem here that needs to be addressed, but we disagree with most of that
commentary about the size of the problem. Based on the existing evidence,
we believe that the costs associated with this new form of
multijurisdictional litigation are relatively small and therefore that only
relatively inexpensive, limited solutions should be adopted. In the next
section, we survey the possible policy solutions.
C. Current Proposals for Fixing the Problem
Based on the forgoing discussion, we think that fee distribution
litigation may impose limited social costs and somewhat greater private
costs, particularly on larger, more established plaintiffs’ firms. Various
possible solutions exist, some resting on judicial actions and others looking
to legislative action or private ordering. In this section, we evaluate six
solutions in light of two major lessons from the previous Parts: first, that the
empirical evidence seems to point not so much to an increase in strike suits,
but instead to a jump in multidistrict litigation seeking a share of the
attorneys’ fees arising from suits with some merit, and second, that broader
jurisdictional and procedural policies limit some of the solutions proposed.
255

As noted above, deal cases do not involve many substantive motions and are resolved quickly.
See id. at 176, 189.
256
We caution that there is more work to be done to empirically document what are the extra costs
associated with multiple lawsuits being filed in different courts for each transaction and when such
additional costs are material.
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1. Matsushita, Reverse Auctions, and Collateral Attacks.—The lure
of obtaining the first settlement among multiple suits arising out of the
same action looms large in the practicality of representative litigation. After
Matsushita, the first lawyer to achieve a global settlement can effectively
block suits by other firms seeking to represent the class. A law firm unable
to participate in the litigation in the initial jurisdiction (e.g., by not being
selected as lead plaintiff or as part of the steering committee for that
litigation) has an incentive to file in a second jurisdiction to gain control of
the litigation or to obtain a seat at the settlement table when fees are being
negotiated. Professor Coffee’s writing on “reverse auctions” describes how
defendants can force plaintiffs that have filed competing actions arising out
of the same transaction to bid against one another to settle the case most
cheaply.257 By doing so, the class action defendant seeks to secure a global
settlement for as little as possible. However, this also has an indirect effect
of reducing plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives to aggressively litigate in the first
place because a firm that invests a lot in developing a case risks seeing the
fruits of its labor expropriated by a low-cost, free-riding firm that is willing
to settle the case for less.258
On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Matsushita II provided one response
to the problem, denying finality if there is a constitutional defense such as
lack of adequate representation.259 The Ninth Circuit allowed the absent
members of the class to claim that they were inadequately represented by
the settling attorneys.260 While some scholars favor this approach,261 others
have been critical of it, claiming that it leads to excessive litigation.262
257

Class Wars, supra note 81, at 1370.
Some commentators have urged courts to split plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees equitably (recognizing
that often the attorneys who do most of the research and litigate the most aggressively are undercut by
others looking for a quick settlement and that such an outcome is inequitable). See Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v.
MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 784 (1998).
259
Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Matsushita II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1251 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
260
Id.; see also Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 65, 94 (2003) (“Of the proposals put forward, the one most consistent with accepted attorney
compensation norms is to link attorneys’ fees to the amount of benefit the attorney provides the
class . . . .”).
261
See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral
Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 321–22 (2006) (suggesting that
the collateral attack mechanism encourages more productive bargaining between the parties at the onset
of the settlement process because they know that the settlement can be attacked later if inadequate).
262
Kahan & Silberman, supra note 258, at 784 (“[T]he collateral attack remedy created by
Matsushita II entails substantial costs. Recall, in this respect, the breadth of the remedy: A collateral
attack appears to be available without a threshold showing that forum shopping has in fact
occurred . . . .”); see also Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 49, at 1669 (noting that the court
invalidating the settlement may be anomalous or, “to put the point another way, what if the second
forum is the product of the same type of forum shopping, only this time on behalf of an improperly
motivated attack on a well-considered class settlement?”). But see Patrick Woolley, The Availability of
Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 443 (2000)
258
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Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda argue for a more limited collateral
attack, available only in strategically filed cases.263 Under their proposal,
cases could only be reopened under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which would allow for a change due to, for instance, new evidence or
mistake by counsel.264 After the review under Rule 60(b), collateral attack
would be semi-precluded for structural issues, dealing with the bargaining
but not the substance of the deal. Preclusion would turn on “the rigor of the
rendering court’s determination of the structural question”; if the original
court made a “reasoned determination,” then the attack is precluded.265
Collateral attack would be precluded for “performance defects” (i.e., a bad
settlement but not an unfair one), as long as the party had a chance to object
in the original court.266
Other proposals have focused on adjusting attorneys’ fees under
Matsushita to mute the incentives imposed by finality.267 Overall, this
approach is a very litigation-intensive solution, requiring a case-by-case
determination on a factually intense basis. Plaintiffs who did not get
attorneys’ fees would be the ones bringing the case, in effect requiring them
to double down their investment on a lawsuit that would have not yet
provided any return.
2. Judicial Cooperation and Comity.—Judicial comity is an
alternative, judicially based solution that could, unlike the approaches just
discussed, address these issues before a case is heavily litigated. Beginning
in the early 2000s, when the problem of multijurisdictional litigation in
M&A litigation first emerged, Chancellor William Chandler of the
Delaware Chancery Court developed a practice of pursuing judicial
comity.268 Initially on a sua sponte basis,269 but later in response to a Savitt
(“Notwithstanding the longstanding availability of collateral attack, such attacks have not been common,
suggesting that there is no basis for alarmist predictions.” (footnote omitted)).
Kahan and Silberman also argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision undercuts the policy behind the
Full Faith and Credit Act. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 258, at 785 (arguing that the Full Faith
and Credit Act is based on a policy of finality, and that allowing collateral attacks on adequacy of
representation inevitably goes against finality as it allows cases to be relitigated in other fora).
263
Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 49, at 1655.
264
Id. at 1711–12. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) only allows for review in the
same forum that the original case was filed in, removing the possibility of forum shopping. Id.
Issacharoff and Nagareda note the availability of malpractice actions against the lawyers that negotiated
the bad settlement, but also acknowledge that, to proceed on a malpractice action, the plaintiff must
recognize that the settlement is binding, something many plaintiffs are unwilling to do given other
alternatives. Id. at 1712.
265
Id. at 1716–17.
266
Id. at 1719.
267
See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 258, at 778; Lahav, supra note 260, at 93–95.
268
E-mail from Chancellor William Chandler to Randall Thomas (July 21, 2011) (on file with
authors).
269
Chancellor Chandler would only proceed if counsel for the parties were in agreement with this
approach. Id.
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motion,270 Chandler would contact the other judge(s) in courts with pending
litigation from the same transaction and discuss which forum was the most
appropriate for the litigation to proceed. For example, in Nierenberg v.
CKx, Inc.,271 plaintiffs filed cases arising out of the same transaction in
Delaware before Chancellor Chandler and in New York before Judge
Ramos of the New York Supreme Court.272 The two judges agreed that it
was duplicative for both matters to proceed and ultimately determined that
the two cases should be consolidated in Delaware, after which the New
York plaintiffs voluntarily stayed their case and joined in the Delaware
litigation.273
The attraction of judicial comity is that it can be implemented without
any changes to the existing litigation system and, if practiced effectively by
judges and agreed to by counsel, will result in all cases arising out of the
same transaction being litigated in one forum.274 Well-intentioned judges
can effectively weigh factors such as their courts’ respective docket delays,
their expertise in deciding corporate law issues, the quality of the cases filed
in their jurisdiction, the qualifications of the attorneys pursuing the matter,
the consent of the attorneys involved, and the strength of their jurisdiction’s
interest in a corporation’s affairs in determining which court is most
appropriate to handle the case. As practiced by Chancellor Chandler,
judicial comity has been an efficient mechanism for reallocating these cases
between state courts without demanding too much of their time. Moreover,
practitioners think that it works well most of the time.275
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks to this approach. First, one can
easily imagine that not all judges, nor all attorneys, will be willing to
participate in this process. Because it is an informal, judge-driven solution,
the potential for defections is significant, and there is no policing
mechanism.276 Moreover, even judges that participate may have incentives
270

Id. A Savitt motion, named after Bill Savitt of the firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, is a
motion filed by the defendants in M&A litigation asking the competing courts with litigation based on
the same transaction to reach a decision about the appropriate forum for the case. See Flinn &
McCormick, supra note 236, at 5 n.2.
271
Nos. 5545-CC, 6519-CC, 6524-CC, 2011 WL 2185614 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2011).
272
Id. at *1.
273
Id. at *2. Ultimately, Chancellor Chandler applied the Hirt factors, discussed below, to
determine the lead counsel structure of the Delaware case. See id. at *2 & n.7.
274
Federal courts may be able to do the same in a somewhat different manner: a federal court could
abstain under the Colorado River doctrine from hearing federal proxy claims and breach of fiduciary
duty claims in favor of a Delaware action raising similar claims under Delaware law. See, e.g.,
Micheletti & Parker, supra note 190, at 45.
275
Micheletti & Parker, supra note 190, at 16–17 (“By and large, such motion practice has been
successful . . . .”).
276
Although the judicial clerkship application process is quite different, it provides an excellent
illustration of the difficulty of getting judges to abide by self-imposed rules when they perceive
advantages in defecting from them. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Judges Compete for Clerks on Lawless
Terrain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2011, at B1 (discussing judicial rebellion from the clerkship hiring plan).
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to divert cases to inefficient jurisdictions. For example, presiding over highprofile cases may provide some judges with significant psychological
benefits, perhaps because of favorable press coverage (especially for elected
judges) or a greater sense of personal importance. Finally, judges may
simply disagree about the proper forum for a case even after exerting great
efforts to reach a successful resolution. In this event, unless one judge is
willing to concede the point, there will still be more than one forum where
the litigation proceeds.
Assessing the value of judicial comity as a solution to the
multijurisdictional litigation problem requires a careful cost–benefit
analysis. We think that it is a relatively low-cost, easily reversible policy
approach that has the great virtue of not requiring any dramatic (and
untested) changes to the existing judicial system’s treatment of
representative litigation. It has great flexibility, as it is a case-by-case
approach that permits judges to carefully weigh the respective interests of
their jurisdiction and its corporations in having the litigation resolved in
their court. For example, a California court and a Delaware court could well
conclude that a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in California, all
of the potential witnesses and documents in that state, and all of its
investors located there, was better served by having the case litigated in
California rather than Delaware. If, as we suggest here based on current
empirical evidence,277 multijurisdictional litigation is a much less costly
problem than some lawyers claim, then this low-cost and easily reversible
solution is the best one to implement at this time.278
3. Reforms to Increase Monitoring of Attorneys’ Fees.—If forum
shopping is often the result of poorly monitored class counsel taking selfserving actions, then one solution could be for state courts to implement
measures to improve the class representatives’ incentives to monitor their
attorneys.279 The lead plaintiff provision that was added to the federal
securities laws in 1995 has been the most notable recent reform, but it does
not apply to the bulk of state litigation.280
Delaware judges have been outspoken in recent years about their
perceptions of class counsel’s abuses in the deal litigation process. For
277

If new empirical evidence becomes available that indicates the problem has become more costly,
then we would need to revisit this issue.
278
To the extent that other states’ courts face novel issues of Delaware law, they would be able to
certify them to the Delaware Supreme Court under the terms of the Delaware constitution. DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 11(8).
279
See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, slip op. at 8–9, 17
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (noting that “clients can and should . . . closely monitor[] the actions of their
attorneys” and highlighting congressional measures to incentivize increased monitoring (citing New
Look, supra note 5, at 148)); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(discussing self-serving behavior of class counsel).
280
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1588–89 (2006).
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example, Chancellor Strine has been blunt in his critique of class counsel in
some matters.281 Perhaps as a result, the Delaware Chancery Court moved to
implement a form of lead plaintiff provision.282 The leading case, Hirt v.
United States Timberlands Service Co.,283 provides a six-factor test for
determining lead plaintiffs.284 While the multifactor test makes Delaware’s
approach broader and more nuanced than the federal approach,285 the federal
approach of preferring the largest investor, expressed in Delaware as
“relevant economic standing,” is one of the most important of Delaware’s
factors. After some initial back and forth between members of the court,286
Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Laster appeared to agree that the
significance of the plaintiff having a substantial economic stake is that it
281

See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 622 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that
the counsel had dubious incentives); see also Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 18–20,
Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010).
282
The Court has stated a preference that class action plaintiffs agree on a lead plaintiff and counsel
without involving the Court, but nevertheless has been willing to develop the Hirt test. See Hirt v. U.S.
Timberlands Serv. Co., C.A. No. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342 (Del. Ch. Jul. 3, 2002); see also In re
Revlon, 990 A.2d at 955 (“On those occasions when this Court has been forced to choose among
competing candidates for lead counsel, our decisions have stressed the importance of [the Hirt]
factors . . . .” (emphasis added)); Wiehl v. Eon Labs, C.A. No. 1116-N, at 10, 2005 WL 5755542, at *5
(Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) (ordering plaintiffs’ counsel to convene and determine a litigation structure);
TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commn’cs, Inc., C.A. Nos. 18336, 18289, 18293, at 7–8, 2000
WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“In every single instance that I am able to recall, this Court
has resisted being drawn into [disputes about coordinating the prosecution of shareholder litigation].”).
283
2002 WL 1558342, at *2. Hirt heavily relied on the TCW decision for the first five factors and
added a sixth in reliance on Court Rule 23(a)’s focus on competence and resources of counsel. Id. The
factors are: (1) “the quality of the pleading that appears best able to represent the interests of the
shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs; [(2)] the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants
in the outcome of the lawsuit (to be accorded ‘great weight’); [(3)] the willingness and ability of all the
contestants to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire class of shareholders; [(4)] the absence of any
conflict between larger, often institutional, stockholders and smaller stockholders; [(5)] the enthusiasm
or vigor with which the various contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit; [(6)] competence of counsel
and their access to the resources necessary to prosecute the claims at issue.”). Id. (footnotes omitted).
284
Id.; see also King v. Verifone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011) (noting the
purpose and use of considering various factors to select both lead counsel and lead plaintiffs); In re Del
Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 22 (applying the Hirt factors to determine whether counsel would
effectively represent the class); In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 955 (discussing the court’s reliance on “factors
that will lead to meaningful representation”).
285
See In re Del Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 10 (“The Hirt factors contemplate a more nuanced
and case-specific test [than the federal test] in which the Court examines both the proposed lead counsel
and the proposed named plaintiff.”). The Delaware approach also avoids a bright-line rule. Id.
286
Originally, Chancellor Chandler in TCW thought that “the Court should give weight to the
shareholder plaintiff that has the greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” TCW, 2000 WL
1654504, at *4. In 2002, Vice Chancellor Lamb held in Hirt that the relative economic stakes should be
given great weight. See Hirt, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2. The Vice Chancellor explained in Wiehl that
great weight should be given to the examination of relative economic stakes as a share of the company’s
total outstanding stock. See Wiehl, 2005 WL 5755542, at *3. Because each plaintiff’s “respective stakes
in [the company was] miniscule,” Vice Chancellor Lamb saw no “substantial relative difference.” Id. In
Dutiel, Chandler indicated that Wiehl confused relative with absolute. Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc.,
C.A. Nos. 4743-CC, 4845-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2009). Ultimately,
Chancellor Chandler concluded that focusing on only relative or only absolute economic stakes can
undermine the analysis. Id.
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“provide[s] an economic incentive to monitor counsel and play a
meaningful role in conducting the case.”287 In Hirt, the plaintiff with a
greater economic stake in the case’s outcome prevailed as lead plaintiff, but
none of the other factors entered into the court’s decision, nor did they
receive much discussion.288
While size of economic stake should be an important factor,289 other
aspects of the test highlight useful additional concerns. For example, one
valuable aspect of the Hirt test is its concern with quality of representation:
better quality law firms should do a better job of representing the
shareholder class.290 Moreover, by rejecting the first-in-time rule for the
selection of lead counsel, the Hirt factors discourage hasty filings and
subpar prosecution of the suit.291 Furthermore, because it includes a number
of factors pertaining to plaintiffs’ counsel and their prior behavior in the
litigation, the Hirt test ensures a comprehensive, nuanced approach. Judges
can consider any facts they deem relevant to selecting the plaintiff and law
firm most likely to achieve the best result for the plaintiff class as a whole.
In Del Monte, for instance, a potential class representative, Union, held a
$36 million investment in the defendant, by far the largest stake of any of
the plaintiffs.292 But because Union faced a potential standing issue, Vice
Chancellor Laster determined that the expedited schedule demanded that
the case avoid “side issues” and held that the standing issue was a conflict
of interest under factor four.293
287

In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 955. In Del Monte, Laster quotes that language and clarifies that a
plaintiff must have a “sufficiently large stake to provide incentive to monitor counsel and reduce agency
costs.” In re Del Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 11–12 (dismissing lead plaintiff classification for a
plaintiff with only $7000 in holdings and finding that a $36 million holding is more significant than a
$475,000 holding). Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis looked to plaintiff’s overall holdings in the
company, as well as to the share those holdings represented in each plaintiff’s portfolio. Id. In Dutiel,
Chandler suggested that the court consider the economic stakes and identities of the plaintiffs to
determine their incentive to “participate in the litigation and monitor his or her counsel.” 2009 WL
3494626, at *3.
288
2002 WL 1558342, at *3.
289
Transcript of Oral Argument on Competing Motions for Appointment of Colead Plaintiffs and
Colead Counsel and Class Certification and Rulings of the Court at 76, In re Medco Health Solutions,
Inc. S’Holders Litig., C.A. No. 6720-CS (Consolidated) (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 2011) (“If I have to decide
on the groups as proposed, I, frankly, go with the group with the larger shares in terms of the collective
track record of those involved in this area of law.”).
290
In the words of one prominent plaintiffs’ attorney, “the quality of pleadings factor is a proxy for
who has done the most work leading up to the lead counsel fight and who is likely to be the best lawyer
for the class.” Interview by Randall Thomas with plaintiffs’ lawyer (Jan. 31, 2012).
291
2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (“[N]o special weight or status will be accorded to a lawsuit ‘simply by
virtue of having been filed earlier than any other pending action.’” (quoting TCW, 2000 WL 1654504, at
*3)); see also In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 959 (“[A] systemic problem emerges when entrepreneurial
litigators pursue a strategy of filing a large number of actions, investing relatively little time or energy in
any single case, and settling the cases early to minimize case-specific investment and maximize net
profit.”); Hirt, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (factors one, five, and six).
292
In re Del Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 11.
293
Id. at 13–15.
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Although the Hirt test is the established mode of analysis in the
Delaware Chancery Court,294 the inquiry is fact driven and thus varies from
case to case.295 In addition, Vice Chancellor Laster articulated three
categories of Hirt factors in Del Monte296: lead plaintiff factors, counsel’s
performance in the litigation to date, and counsel’s track record and ability
to litigate going forward. Although no other chancery court judge has
applied these factors yet, if the goal is to ensure effective representation of
the class, these additional categories should be considered carefully as a
supplement to the Hirt analysis.
This form of innovative state court action could address perceptions
that representative litigation faces high agency costs. It works well when
multiple cases are filed within the same jurisdiction, yet there is no effective
mechanism for implementing it across jurisdictions.297 Even worse, any
state that pursues such a course of action unilaterally may find that it has
driven representative litigation out of its courts, or more likely, that even
though it has improved the alignment between counsel and clients for cases
in its own courts, the attorneys it did not select to be lead counsel still file
their cases in another state’s courts. In other words, coordinated state action
is needed to ensure that innovative techniques for reducing litigation agency
costs are broadly adopted. While such coordination would be most effective
if it included all states, given that most cases are filed either in the
headquarters state or state of incorporation of the defendant corporation,
even agreement only among the major commercial states would be largely
effective.298
294

Hirt has been applied in subsequent Delaware Chancery Court cases, but does not seem to have
been adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Supreme Court in King merely cites Hirt
in passing, alongside Dutiel, which lists three Hirt factors. See King v. Verifone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d
1140, 1151 & n.66 (Del. 2011) (“Both Delaware and federal courts generally consider various factors
when selecting lead plaintiff (and lead counsel), the goal being to appoint the representative who will
best serve the interests of the corporation and its shareholders and most effectively prosecute the
litigation.”).
295
For example, the Del Monte court thoroughly discussed all six factors individually before
reaching its decision, see In re Del Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 11–22, whereas in Wiehl, the court
only discussed the factors in dispute by the competing plaintiffs’ firms, see Wiehl v. Eon Labs, C.A. No.
1116-N, 2005 WL 5755542, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) (noting that the remaining Hirt factors are
no less important). Similarly, the Dutiel court stressed that “[Delaware] precedent clearly holds that the
Court should consider several factors when deciding which plaintiff the Court will appoint as lead
plaintiff.” Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., C.A. No. 4743-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28,
2009).
296
Del Monte, C.A. No. 6027-VCL, at 11–21. The Vice Chancellor applied the Hirt factors in In re
Mosaic Co. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 6228-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 2011).
297
Professor Quinn’s suggestion of an interstate MDL panel might be another potential state law
innovation that could effectively address litigation agency costs, if it could be implemented politically.
See Quinn, supra note 4, at 162.
298
We note that public corporations that do not elect to incorporate in Delaware almost always
incorporate in the state of the company’s headquarters. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 138, at 383–
84 (discussing factors that motivate incorporation choices). This means that there is generally only one
state court venue option for representative suits against companies from these states.
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4. Providing a Federal Forum for Representative Litigation.—One
way to overcome this state-coordination problem would be through federal
legislation. Existing federal law already provides a federal forum when
there is reason not to trust state courts, as in the context of a plaintiff
litigating in courts of the defendant’s home state, even though the substance
of the home state’s law continues to be applied in the federal court. The
Class Action Fairness Act, federal legislation passed in 2005, expanded that
policy to provide a federal forum for any large class action arising under
state law.299 That legislation, however, contains a Delaware carve out that
preserves state court jurisdiction for matters of corporate governance and
internal corporate affairs, which would cover all of the state law actions
described in Part I.
One option for resolving the problems related to multijurisdictional
litigation would be to force mergers, class actions, and derivative suits to be
heard in federal court where existing processes for multidistrict litigation
could be used for dealing with multiple filings.300 Effectively, the existence
of the MDL panel sharply reduces the incentives that attorneys might
otherwise have to engage in forum shopping in order to take advantage of
perceived differences in the way that different courts may decide cases and
leads to more rational filing patterns.301
As part of federalization, Congress could choose to impose other
litigation agency-cost-reducing requirements on state law mergers and
acquisition class actions and derivative lawsuits.302 One of the PSLRA’s
main features was the lead plaintiff provision, which created a presumption
that the plaintiff with the largest financial stake in the litigation should be
appointed the lead plaintiff.303 The lead plaintiff requirement has had several
beneficial effects on federal securities class actions, including increased
shareholder monitoring of class counsel, greater involvement of
institutional investors, and higher settlements when institutional investors
become involved.304 While Delaware has moved in this direction in recent
years with the promulgation of the Hirt test, to date no other states have

299

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B) (2006).
See id. § 1407. Although technically this only pertains to pretrial matters, as a practical matter a
high percentage of these transferred cases are decided by the transferee court through some form of
pretrial disposition. Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 480 (1989)
(finding that only 18% of cases were remanded to their original court).
301
See Cox et al., supra note 77, at 443–44 (finding that most securities fraud class actions are filed
in the home circuit of the defendant corporation).
302
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 385–86; Comm. on Sec. Litig., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation: A Position Paper 9–10 (2008), available at www.
nycbar.org/pdf/report/Securities_Litigation_%20A.pdf.
303
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).
304
Cox & Thomas, supra note 280, at 1596–97; James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs
and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 355, 385 (2008).
300
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adopted similar requirements. Federalization could impose such a
requirement nationally.305
This result, however, seems the worst kind of compromise. The
substantive law would remain as set by the state legislature, for example,
the Delaware General Corporation Law, but litigation could occur in front
of hundreds of federal district judges spread around the country who seldom
are repeat players in corporate law. It seems logical that, as a general
matter, state courts should be better than federal courts at interpreting state
law, especially if the state courts are specialized business courts interpreting
their own state’s corporate law. It also seems like overkill to federalize the
entire field of state corporate law to solve the problem of forum shopping in
representative litigation. Furthermore, state courts can find ways to reduce
litigation agency costs when they believe action is needed.306 We would lose
most of the advantages of the current Delaware-centric corporate law
system with few countervailing advantages.
The Delaware court system has long been a key part of the Delaware
corporate law product. If Congress were to go this far, why would they not
want to take the then seemingly small additional step of federalizing the
substance of corporate law? Federal preemption of state corporate law is a
heavily debated topic,307 and we are disinclined to spill more ink in the
debate here, but it would seem truly bizarre if, after not enacting
federalization at any time over the last eighty years, Congress were to
choose to do it via a procedural change.
5. Coordinating State Action on Multijurisdictional Litigation.—As
an alternative to federal imposition of a common forum or rule coordinating
cases, states could coordinate among themselves on lead plaintiff
provisions, an MDL process, or an exclusive forum provision. The Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a seven-decade-long project of a
committee of the American Bar Association, already provides the basis for
the corporate law in more than 60% of the states (once enacted by the
legislatures of those states). As such, it would be a logical focal point for
such legislation.308 Delaware, the home of more than 50% of America’s
305

Alternatively, Congress might restrict the carve out to cases filed in the corporation’s state of
incorporation, in most cases Delaware, out of respect for the quality of the Delaware courts in the
corporate law arena. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 386. However, we note that for federal securities
fraud class actions, plaintiffs’ counsel overwhelmingly choose to file in the headquarters state of the
defendant corporation, which is likely to be the most convenient forum for the defendants. See Cox et
al., supra note 77, at 443 tbl.3 (84% of federal securities class actions are filed in the circuit containing
the defendant corporation’s headquarters).
306
See supra Part II.C.3.
307
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (examining the
federal government’s encroachment into corporation law).
308
The other source of state laws across jurisdictions has been the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) (also known as the Uniform Law Commission),
which has sponsored drafts of more than 200 uniform laws on many different subjects, the most famous
of which is the Uniform Commercial Code. They have not done a corporate law project since early in
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largest corporations,309 and such other large commercial states as California
and New York, follow their own statutory structure; yet, Delaware and the
Model Act drafters have often appeared to have moved on similar paths. If
the MBCA were to move on this topic, it seems likely that Delaware would
be very willing to join in similar action. Delaware clearly has the most to
lose from the current situation and would likely join a multistate effort to
fix it. The harder question is why the legislatures of California or New
York, or even Model Act states like Alabama or Arizona, would go along.
Corporations headquartered in those states might well prefer to retain the
safety valve of having the possibility of a suit brought in the courts of their
state if that action (via a Matsushita II settlement) would help the
corporation’s lawyers achieve a more favorable settlement to class action
litigation also being pursued in other jurisdictions.
While there are no mandatory requirements that states act in a
coordinated fashion, there are a number of institutions in place that facilitate
such action. Probably the best known group serving this role professionally
over the years is the American Law Institute (ALI). Its past projects have
addressed both principles of corporate governance and of aggregate
litigation, but multijurisdictional representative litigation, a topic at the
intersection of those two fields, was not included in either.310 Moreover,
such projects take years to reach completion and do not always succeed.
While it is possible that the MBCA or the ALI could take action on this
topic, it seems unlikely to us that the existing law reform organizations
would be able to quickly and universally address the multijurisdictional
litigation issues discussed in this paper.
6. Private Ordering via Charter or Bylaw Provisions.—Spurred by
several practitioners311 and academics,312 private ordering forum selection
provisions in corporate charters or bylaws have moved to the forefront in
the twentieth century. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1457
(1985) (describing the promulgation of the Uniform Business Corporation Act by NCCUSL in 1928, its
adoption in three states, and its withdrawal in 1958).
309
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 698 (2002).
310
In addition to traditional Restatements, and some model act projects, the ALI has also
undertaken studies of areas of the law with more forward-looking suggestions. The first such project was
the Principles of Corporate Governance in 1994. Such projects can become very controversial, as was
the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance project, and are therefore unable to command sufficient
popular support to lead to reform.
311
For an important volume containing numerous articles by practicing lawyers on this topic, see
M&A LITIGATION, supra note 76.
312
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Grundfest, History
and Evolution], available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=2042758; Joseph Grundfest, Choice of Forum
Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1690561; see also Quinn, supra note 4 (detailing the use of the exclusive forum provision as a means
to prevent litigation from leaving Delaware).
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the recent debate over forum selection. The discussion was undoubtedly
further stimulated by Vice Chancellor Laster’s favorable remarks
concerning these clauses in In re Revlon: “[I]f boards of directors and
stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to
respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity
disputes.”313
Some companies have put forum selection provisions in their charters
prior to an initial public offering (IPO),314 a few have submitted charter
amendments to a shareholder vote,315 but most of the adoptions by
established public companies (still a small percentage of public companies)
have been via director-passed bylaws,316 likely reflecting concern that public
company shareholders might vote against such proposed amendments if the
question were put to them for decision.317 As a result, some established
public companies have been able to avoid seeking shareholder approval and
instead inserted these provisions into their bylaws with only director
approval.318
These clauses typically allow the defendant corporation to designate
the court in which shareholders of a defendant corporation can bring
representative litigation.319 Early forms of the clauses were more likely to be
313

990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Some corporations have adopted these provisions before their initial public offering to eliminate
the need for shareholder approval. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN
CHARTERS AND BYLAWS ii (2011), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
Exclusive_Forum_Provisions_Study_4_7_11.pdf (finding that charter amendments are being adopted by
corporations “as they go public, emerge from bankruptcy protection or reincorporate in Delaware,”
thereby eliminating the necessity of shareholder approval); Grundfest, History and Evolution, supra note
312, at 23–25.
315
During the 2011 proxy season, six public companies sought shareholder approval of forum
selection charter amendments, and all but one passed; at least one additional proposal occurred in the
2012 proxy season. ALLEN, supra note 314, at 2.
316
See id. at ii. Allen found that these companies made up 43.9% of companies with forum
selection provisions. Id. Quinn argues that status quo bias is the reason for the infrequency of the
adoption of these provisions. See Quinn, supra note 4, at 142.
317
Institutional Shareholder Services’ voting policies for the 2012 proxy season advised companies
they would evaluate these “exclusive venue” provisions on a case-by-case basis, asking whether the
company in question has good corporate governance structures currently in place and whether it has
disclosed any material harm done to it by shareholder litigation in other jurisdictions. INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY: 2012 UPDATES 13 (2011), available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS_2012US_Updates20111117.pdf.
Momentum to add a forum selection bylaw may also be impacted by litigation. See Bill Kelly &
Elizabeth Weinstein, Exclusive Forum Provisions Update, DAVIS POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (June
21, 2012, 11:05 PM), www.davispolk.com/briefing/corporategovernance/?entry=186 (reporting lawsuits
in Delaware courts against about a dozen companies for adding exclusive forum provisions via bylaws,
of which two firms, Chevron and FedEx, continue to litigate the validity of the bylaws; this suggests
most companies will wait for guidance from the chancery court before taking further action).
318
ALLEN, supra note 314, at ii. While shareholders generally have the power to amend corporate
bylaws, there have been no publicly disclosed attempts by shareholders to do so to date. Id.
319
See Nathan, supra note 101, at 122 (providing an example of a forum selection clause).
314
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mandatory in nature, requiring litigation to proceed in the state of
incorporation, while more of the recent ones are elective clauses that give
the corporation the option to require use of the state of incorporation or to
permit litigation filed in the company’s headquarters state to go forward.320
Proponents advance several arguments in favor of using charter or
bylaw forum selection provisions: (1) they encourage consistent
interpretation of the law of the state of incorporation, particularly in
Delaware, and they may limit litigation of shareholder disputes to one
forum, reducing duplicative law suit filings, while maintaining a convenient
forum; (2) Delaware has a specialized court system with considerable
expertise in corporate law that provides more certainty in outcomes; and
(3) forum selection provisions in general are permissible as a matter of
contract law, and the corporate charter is a contract. There are some
problems with them as well: (1) a strong push by Delaware for such clauses
may spark a backlash from other states, federal regulators, and plaintiffs’
lawyers; (2) other states’ courts may refuse to enforce them, leading to
additional litigation in these representative actions claiming they impinge
on shareholders’ fundamental right to enforce the fiduciary duties that
directors and officers owe them; and (3) as discussed below, the issue of
shareholder consent, especially as to management-imposed bylaws.321 On
balance, while such provisions (if widely adopted and systematically
enforced by foreign courts) may help reduce litigation agency costs, they
may also increase managerial agency costs by giving corporate
management control over one of shareholders’ principal monitoring
mechanisms to address managerial misconduct, making it difficult to know
which approach maximizes social welfare.
Nor are we persuaded that the contract law analogy is conclusive. It is
true that forum selection clauses are widely found in corporate contracts,
such as merger agreements (as are a related set of clauses regarding choice
of law).322 And courts generally enforce them as a matter of contract law.323
In our setting, however, the contract is not between two corporations, but
rather between the shareholders and managers within the corporation,
raising the familiar issues of governance and shareholder monitoring of
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Although the clear target of such clauses is representative litigation, in fact their language is
broad enough to apply to direct actions by individual shareholders as well. See Grundfest, Choice of
Forum Provisions, supra note 312, at 6–8 (showing two sample forum provisions).
321
See Quinn, supra note 4, at 139–40; Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of
Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 132–33 (2009).
322
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006).
323
See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (stating that a forum
selection clause must be viewed under the realities of form passage contracts); Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1972) (holding that a venue provision in a freely negotiated contract
should not be set aside absent a strong showing that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or
that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching).
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management agency costs.324 Corporate law permits contracting on such
shareholder issues in some contexts, but not in others. After the Smith v.
Van Gorkom decision, corporate statutes have permitted corporations to
include provisions in their articles of incorporation by which they may
exculpate directors for breaches of the duty of care, but not the duty of
loyalty.325 These charter amendments must be approved by shareholders.326
In other areas, such as dual class recapitalizations, even shareholderapproved charter amendments have been prohibited because their potential
effect of increasing managerial agency costs is too great. Are forum
selection provisions permissible given their potential impact on
shareholders’ ability to bring suit to limit managerial agency costs?
Should shareholders be bound when directors use their broad powers in
corporate law to insert such a provision into the bylaws without a direct
shareholder vote? At present, there appears to be little support for allowing
these bylaws. For example, when Vice Chancellor Laster raised the
visibility of this issue, he expressly referred to action by both “directors and
stockholders” that they believe it would be value enhancing,327 highlighting
the importance of shareholder approval of forum selection provisions.
Furthermore, opponents of director bylaw provisions won the first case
raising this issue when, in Galaviz v. Berg, a federal district court rejected a
forum selection provision in the bylaws of Oracle corporations that required
all derivative actions to be filed in the Court of Chancery in Delaware.328
Based on this bylaw, the defendants moved to dismiss the case on the basis
of wrongful venue, claiming that the bylaw constituted an enforceable
provision under contract law.329 That the bylaw had been unilaterally
adopted by the directors after plaintiff shareholder brought a derivative
action claiming that the board had breached their fiduciary duties eliminated
the consent needed to support a contract analogy.330
324

See supra Part I.A.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
326
Id. § 242(b)(2) (2011) (requiring approval of shareholders for amendment of articles).
327
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010); see ALLEN, supra note
314, at iv (92.7% of forum selection clauses adopted after Laster’s statement).
328
See 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“[T]he venue provision was unilaterally
adopted by the directors who are defendants in this action, after the majority of the purported
wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred, and without the consent of existing shareholders who acquired
their shares when no such bylaw was in effect.”).
329
Id. at 1171.
330
Id. at 1174–75. The court did note that if the corporation had obtained such consent, then its
contract law arguments would be stronger. There is a split of the federal circuits as to whether this
question should be determined by state law or federal common law. Compare Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v.
Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal common law applies to the enforceability of
the venue provision because the federal procedural interests “significantly outweigh the state interests”
under Erie), with Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356–57 (3d Cir.
1986) (forum selection clause was a contract question and should generally be a state law matter, except
when there is a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law); see
also Nutter v. New Rents, Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22952, at *14–20 (4th Cir. Oct. 1,
325
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A separate issue is whether jurisdictional or constitutional issues
prevent a forum selection clause. Citizens are able to use the general
jurisdiction of the various states to sue defendants over whom that court has
personal jurisdiction, and individual states are unable to divest another state
from asserting such jurisdiction.331 Federal law provides a litigant the ability
to pursue a state law claim in a federal tribunal if the plaintiff wants to
avoid the home-state courts of the defendant; forum selection clauses seek
to prevent plaintiffs from making such choices.332 Interestingly, the court
often chosen by plaintiffs is not a federal court but rather a state court in the
state of the corporation’s headquarters.333 Such a court, if anything, would
be sympathetic to the interests of the hometown corporation and less
interested in a shareholder representative from out of state. Such a pattern
illustrates that the reality is that forum selection behavior is more about
attorneys’ fees (and more particularly which sets of attorneys gets fees), and
neither diversity jurisdiction nor general jurisdiction has much to say. Apart
from corporate law, the balance ought also to take into account the
procedural values of letting parties bring suit against defendants in
jurisdictions where they can be reached and permitting parties to have
access to federal courts as a response to possible home court
discrimination.334

1991) (forum selection clause was a matter of state law); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F.
Supp. 977, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (finding state law governs the forum selection clause), aff’d, 838 F.2d
1215 (6th Cir. 1988).
331
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359 (1914) (holding that a state cannot, by
legislation, effectively divest another state’s courts of the power to hear cases over which they would
otherwise have jurisdiction).
332
See U.S CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting judiciary the authority to hear diversity cases); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2006) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); see also Stevelman, supra note 321, at 131 (“[A]ny
measures to limit shareholder-plaintiffs’ otherwise legitimate access to the federal courts would almost
certainly prove unconstitutional.”).
333
See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 36, at 13 n.7.
334
Delaware has asserted a countervailing constitutional interest in having its substantive law apply
under the internal affairs doctrine. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987)
(application of the internal affairs doctrine mandated by constitutional principles, except in the rarest
situations). Its courts have also asserted constitutional support for the broad reach of its courts’
jurisdiction in deciding internal affairs disputes. Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 177 (Del.
1980) (“If it be conceded, as surely it must, that Delaware has the power to establish the rights and
responsibilities of those who manage its domestic corporations, it seems inconceivable that the Delaware
Courts cannot seek to enforce these obligations but must, rather, leave the lion’s share of the
enforcement task to a host of other jurisdictions with little familiarity or experience with our law,
jurisdictions which may or may not even choose to apply Delaware law depending on the vagaries of
each jurisdiction’s choice of law rules. We find nothing in ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice’ which compels such anomalous results.”). In the recent debate over multiple filings,
the argument has extended to Delaware’s primacy as a forum, not just the source of substantive law,
albeit an argument based on comity and public policy rather than constitutional requirements. In re
Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Representative plaintiffs seeking to
wield the cudgel for all stockholders of a Delaware corporation have no legitimate interest in obtaining a
ruling from a non-Delaware court.”). See Part II.C.2 for a discussion of comity.
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Weighing these arguments, we are not persuaded that charter and
bylaw provisions are the best solution to the issues raised by fee distribution
litigation for several reasons. First, as we discussed in Part II.B.3 above, it
is important to remember that forum selection clauses are nothing more
than forum shopping by defendants. There is little reason to privilege
defendant forum shopping over plaintiff forum shopping. Second, the use of
bylaws that can be implemented without shareholder consent, or even
charter amendments that require such consent, forces us to confront the
weakness of shareholders’ voting rights under current law. Starting with
bylaws—the weaker of the two provisions—proponents of these
amendments have argued that in most situations shareholders have the
power to amend bylaws imposed by incumbent boards of directors and that
this is sufficient protection against self-interested director conduct.335 Given
the substantial collective action problems shareholders would face in
launching a ballot initiative to change a bylaw, particularly one that does
not involve a change-of-control transaction, and the fact that management
could then quickly reverse the shareholders’ action in most states, investors
will not be able to change bylaw provisions except when faced with the
most egregious wrongdoing. Effectively, this would make bylaw changes
virtually irreversible unilateral director action absent the kind of unusual
shareholder activism seen in classified board provisions.336
The case for charter amendments is stronger, but still fraught with
difficulty. On the plus side, charter amendments require a shareholder
vote,337 which provides some protection to investors, although they still face
collective action problems. The presence of third-party voting advisors that
issue voting recommendations on forum selection clause votes should help
to overcome the collective action problem in this situation.338 Nevertheless,
as Professor Gordon has aptly noted in his work on dual class
recapitalizations, shareholder approval of charter amendments does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they increase shareholder wealth. In
fact, these amendments may actually decrease wealth.339 He argues that the
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This is a particularly suspect claim where directors are adopting such amendments after they
have been sued for alleged misconduct, or where they adopt bylaws that give the board the discretion to
select one forum among a group of potential forums once shareholder litigation has been filed.
336
For classified boards, shareholders have had to make precatory Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals
seeking a vote on the removal of the classified board, obtain a majority vote of the company’s
shareholders in favor of such action, and then persuade the company’s board of directors to allow
shareholders to vote to remove the classified board from the company’s certificate of incorporation.
Thomas & Cotter, supra note 24, at 370, 377–78, 384, 389. Such activism has become more common in
recent years. See id. at 388–89.
337
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(b) (2011).
338
ISS has issued voting guidelines to its clients concerning forum selection clauses. See
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 317, at 13.
339
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder
Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988).
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presence of collective action problems340 and strategic choice issues341
undercut efficiency-based arguments for charter amendments in that setting.
Similar arguments may be made against forum selection clauses, as
they can have a management-protection purpose that motivates them as
well. For example, while we do not yet know the shareholder profile of
firms that have proposed, or will propose, forum selection amendments, it is
possible that they may be skewed toward firms with high insider stock
ownership and low levels of institutional shareholdings. Management might
also use sweeteners, or implicit threats, to induce shareholders to approve
these charter amendments. We hasten to add that it is currently too soon to
tell if these things will occur, but they are significant potential problems
that could be manifested in shareholder votes on forum selection charter
amendments.
Finally, we worry about the lock-in effect of such provisions. As we
noted with bylaws, it will be very difficult for shareholders to organize to
remove a bylaw, and it is effectively impossible for them to remove a
charter amendment without board cooperation because directors alone have
the power to recommend such changes. Almost all of these forum selection
provisions are aimed at forcing plaintiffs to file representative litigation in
Delaware.342 What will happen to shareholders’ power to sue if the
Delaware courts were to manifest extreme hostility to these cases? At
present, Delaware seems, in most cases, to be doing an excellent job
balancing investor and management interests, but there are many who doubt
this claim both today and historically.343 We think that this requires careful
consideration before any rush to permit corporate forum selection
provisions.
CONCLUSION
One of the key problems that American corporate law has struggled
with for the past eighty years is how to constrain managerial conduct when
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The evidence summarized in the article shows that firms making such proposals tend to have
lower than average institutional ownership and greater insider stock ownership. See id. at 45.
341
In that context, Gordon claims that management may tie the recapitalization to an unrelated
dividend sweetener or threaten to take action adverse to shareholder interests if their proposal is
defeated. See id. at 47.
342
See ALLEN, supra note 314, at i.
343
The race to the top versus race to the bottom debate over the impact of Delaware law on
shareholder welfare has been going on for generations. For a good summary of the literature favoring
the race to the top viewpoint, see ROMANO, supra note 82. In recent years, Lucian Bebchuk has been the
strongest advocate for the race to the bottom perspective. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435 (1992). Mark Roe has recently argued that the federal government is the party that most actively
influences state corporate law. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491
(2005).
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ownership is separated from control.344 Our corporate law relies heavily on
the limited shareholder powers of voting, selling, and suing to help in that
effort. Derivative suits and class actions remain core instruments used to
check the broad control that corporate law gives directors and managers
over the collective assets owned by others. Not only are these litigation
rights longstanding, but they are split between two levels of government—
both as to substance and as to procedural rules—which ensures that
multiple routes are possible in many corporate disputes. This leads to the
possibility of strategic behavior by plaintiffs in filing one cause of action
versus another.
From our focus on the intended governance role of litigation—the
deliberate choice in our polity to provide dueling sources of law to provide
the basis for such litigation and the economic reality that follows from
giving law firms center stage in providing this enforcement—we develop a
theory of shareholder litigation as applied to contemporary corporate and
securities law. In our theory, the outcome of this effort to constrain
management agency costs without generating excessive litigation agency
costs necessarily must model not just the legal rules, but also the roles of
plaintiff law firms, defendant law firms, and courts. There are times that the
interaction of these three groups will produce a beneficial combination, and
times when it may not. In short, shareholder litigation experiences a
dynamic process over time that requires constant balancing of managerial
agency costs and litigation agency costs.
Shareholder suits filed in multiple jurisdictions raise many of the same
issues of class actions generally. In addition, any effort to address them
must take into account the distinctive role of shareholder litigation in
corporate governance. However, like other class actions, the economics of
shareholder litigation mean that attorneys have the prime economic
incentive to pursue these suits and attorney self-interest can distort the
process. Such litigation agency costs are regularly weighed against
litigation’s role in combating undue losses from management agency costs.
Multiple-plaintiff law firms seeking to represent the group—and to share in
attorneys’ fees that may follow from such suits—are one cause for the
proliferation of suits within a single jurisdiction. This interacts with the
incentives of different law firms to pursue jurisdictions other than the place
of incorporation if that produces a better result (which can be measured in
terms of greater recovery for the class, or rearranging the distribution of
attorneys’ fees or extracting rents from the process).
Applying our theory to the multijurisdictional representative
shareholder litigation that is observed today, we see again the importance of
balancing managerial agency costs and litigation agency costs. On the
managerial agency cost side of the ledger, permitting shareholders (and
344

ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119 (rev. ed. 1968).
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courts) to determine where it is appropriate to file their representative
actions has value because it reinforces the importance of that limited power.
Furthermore, keeping an open market for corporate law so that the
Delaware courts do not establish a virtual monopoly on litigation issues
gives that state’s courts a continuing incentive to listen to shareholder
concerns.
On the cost side, it is not clear that multijurisdictional litigation creates
significant costs. The additional filing of derivative suits as tagalongs to
Rule 10b-5 lawsuits is likely more of a rearranging of the pool of attorneys’
fees; it likely does not affect the size of that pool or even the size of the
recovery, and may add some corporate governance benefits when those
cases settle. For mergers and acquisitions class action litigation in state
courts, the fact that should be of greatest interest to legal reformers is not
the percentage of deals that attract suits (particularly in the post-financialcrisis period when the number of deals decreased markedly), but the
number of deals in which lawyers receive fees separate from recovery for
shareholders and the size of those fees. There is not at this time sufficient
empirical evidence that the number of deals experiencing litigation has
increased significantly, nor that the cost of settling a strong set of cases
varies much depending on whether they are filed in one jurisdiction or
another. For traditional derivative suits in state courts, the existing
empirical evidence is too weak for us to draw firm conclusions.
Given the limited costs and benefits associated with multijurisdictional
shareholder litigation, we believe that a low-cost, easily implemented
solution that can be readily reversed is the best answer. We believe that
judicial comity is the best, lowest cost option currently available. We
consider, but reject, forum selection bylaws and charter provisions because
they are effectively irreversible, provide inadequate protection of
shareholder interests, and constitute defendant forum shopping. However,
in reaching these conclusions, we recognize that they are based on the
current empirical evidence concerning these suits. As our theory points out,
times change, and the balance between litigation agency costs and
managerial agency costs must be reassessed as they do.
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